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Abstract 
In this thesis we have explored the venture capital market and whether the contractual 
mechanisms applied in Norwegian venture capital transactions are optimal for minimizing 
agent-principal costs. From a sample of Norwegian contracts, we extracted a set of the most 
frequently used contractual mechanisms which we compared to previous research conducted 
on the US venture capital market and to relevant financial theory. For analytical purposes we 
divided the mechanisms into two main categories; cash flow rights and control rights. The 
findings in this paper are that contractual mechanisms applied in Norwegian venture capital 
transactions contribute to minimize the agent-principal costs, even though there are some 
possible areas of improvement. 
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1. Introduction                                                                                           
1.1 Problem definition 
”A bank is a place that will lend you money if you can prove that you don't need it.”  
(Bob Hope) 
 
Earlier, banks and other passive investors were the prevalent source of funding. This type of 
financing did not back innovative high risk companies. However, today there is an emerging 
financial market which accepts higher risk exposure in exchange for the possibility of active 
ownership. This enables full funding without the involvement of banks and helps spur 
innovation. 
 
Investors seeking high risk early stage investments are in general called venture capitalists. 
The relationship between the venture capitalists and their portfolio companies is still a quite 
unexplored domain of financial theory. This is especially an issue for the Norwegian venture 
capital industry, where there is also a shortage of empirical studies. Several important 
questions are still to be answered. The opportunities to explore new aspects, and hopefully 
make a small contribution to the field, attracted our attention to venture capital. 
  
The relationship is governed by a contract where several provisions regarding the distribution 
of claims and rights are outlined. For the cooperation in the relationship to be efficient, the 
distribution has to be optimal. In this thesis, we want to analyse Norwegian venture capital 
contracts based on the following problem definition: Are contractual mechanisms applied in 
Norwegian venture capital transactions optimal for minimizing agent-principal costs? 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This paper will open with a general definition of venture capital and follow up with an 
overview and overall development of the Norwegian market (chapter two). Chapter three 
covers the relevant financial theory applied in chapter four. The theory is based on well 
known academic research studies. The aim of the theory presented is to achieve a first best 
investment solution, hence, minimizing the involved agent-principal cost. Parallel with the 
theory presentation, we have included an imaginary case example (box 1 to box 5).  
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In chapter four we analyze our empirical observations in light of the problem definition 
previously outlined. The findings are compared to the theoretically optimal contract structure, 
and summed up for respectively cash flow rights and control rights. In the end we have a final 
conclusion presenting results and highlighting the interaction between cash flow rights and 
control rights in general, as well as the possible complimentary effects of the different 
provisions. 
 
Following the conclusion is a glossary explaining common venture capital expressions and 
phrases and an appendix presenting the check list applied in the data gathering process. 
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2. The Norwegian venture capital market 
2.1 Definitions 
Commonly spoken, private equity is a broad term which refers to any kind of equity 
investment in assets which are not freely traded on a stock-exchange. When consulting the 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), we get this definition: Private equity (PE) is 
equity capital provided by investors to non-quoted companies with a high potential of growth.  
 
The goal of PE investments is to add value to the company through active ownership, which 
style will change accordingly to where the firm is in the life cycle. Dependent of the firm’s 
life stage, we can divide the PE investments into two subsets:  Venture capital (VC) and 
buyout. Throughout this paper we will focus on the VC part. 
 
Firm’s life 
cycle  
Figure 1: www.billyfire.com 
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VC is investments made in the early stages of the business’ life cycle.  It has a focus on 
entrepreneurial undertakings as opposed to buyouts which focus on mature businesses. The 
venture capital found works with the company to help it grow, but with the plan of selling 
their part of the company as it becomes more profitable. The exit is preferably done through 
IPOs, as they are found to be more profitable than private sales (Hege et al, 2006).  
 
2.2 Subcategories of venture capital 
 
The structure of venture capital 
 
Figure 2: source: EVCA 
 
When the investment is made before the company has actually developed a product or service, 
it is called a seed investment. These investments are used for assessing, researching and 
developing the concept of the business. 
 
Start up investment is capital provided for product development and initial marketing in the 
first stages of development. In this phase, the company still has not sold their product or 
service on the commercial market.  
 
Expansion stage financing, also known as development capital, is financing provided for the 
growth and expansion of a company. The company might now have reached the break even 
stage, or even run profitably. The expansion capital is usually used to finance increased 
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production capacity, finance market or product development and to provide additional 
working capital. The meaning of these investments is to help the company grow beyond a 
critical size to increase the profitability. 
 
The last type of venture capital is refinancing. That is usage of capital to repurchase shares or 
reducing the company’s level of gearing. 
 
2.3 The investment process 
The private investor (limited partner) invests in a VC fund which is administered by a VC 
firm (general partner).  In order to invest in the fund, they have to pay a purchase fee. The VC 
firm invests the fund in different companies which they find suited. In return for the cash, the 
fund gets equity in the companies. After a certain time (usually 3-6 years) the fund sells their 
holdings, and the sales profit is divided between the limited and the general partners 
according to up front agreements. 
 
The investment process 
 
 
Figure 3  
  
The general partner’s role is as follows: After raising the capital, they find suited investment 
objects through a screening process. Out of a huge number of possible objects, only one or 
two usually stands out as good enough investment opportunities to qualify for investments. 
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When the money is invested, the general partner contributes to their portfolio companies with 
different expertise. The expertise can relate to such as management, business, geographical 
area or market. Hopefully this active ownership role of the VC firm is going to create value 
for the company.  
 
2.4 PE in Norway 
2.4.1 A brief overview 
Norwegian trade and industry is mainly dominated by small and medium sized companies 
(less than one hundred employees). This category comprises 99.4 per cent of all Norwegian 
companies (SSB 2007). If we narrow it down to less than 20 employees, still 95.3 per cent of 
all companies are included. This indicates that there should be numerous investment 
opportunities for investors willing to explore the venture market. However, the Norwegian 
venture capital market is immature and less sophisticated compared to other markets, such as 
in the US. Even Sweden, which at first glance appears to be quite identical, is further up the 
development ladder. As presented in figure 4, the Norwegian PE (includes both venture 
capital and buy out) investments are, in percentage of GDP, lower than the European average 
and significantly lower than in Sweden. Nevertheless, over the past decade the investment 
momentum has been increasing in all stages of the VC cycle. 
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Figure 4: Source: EVCA 
 
In Norway the distribution of capital committed to PE is somewhat different from most other 
countries. According to the Norwegian Venture Capital Association (NVCA 2007), of a total 
of NOK 37.5bn under management, 66 per cent is committed to VC and 34 per cent to 
buyouts (figure 5). When comparing to other countries, e.g. Sweden, the share of PE 
investments committed to VC is much higher.  
 
 
Figure 5: Source: NVCA 
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2.4.2 Development 
During the 90s the focus on private equity investments in general increased significantly in 
the Norwegian capital markets. However, this did not affect the venture capital sector 
proportionally, which according to OECD experienced a decade of rather sluggish growth 
(OECD 2003). Nevertheless, the new millennium represented the beginning of a new era for 
the Norwegian venture capital industry. In 2001 the NVCA (Norwegian Venture Capital 
Association) was founded and according to a member survey approximately NOK 2bn was 
raised in new funds during year 2000. In the years to follow the industry experienced some 
fluctuations but on average annual growth has been positive, both in terms of capital raised 
and number of new funds established (figure 6). In 2006 the investments skyrocketed and the 
figures from the first half of 2007 do not seem to follow, furthermore, the ongoing credit 
crunch and the increased cost of funding will probably have a negative effect on the 2008 
numbers. 
 
 
Figure 6: Source: NVCA, H1 2007 
 
The recent growth in investment activity accumulates into a higher level of capital under 
management. The 2007 level is all time high. As presented in figure 7 the Norwegian Private 
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Equity industry is dominated by start-up/venture and Buyout. This has been the prevailing 
picture for almost a decade, however before year 2000 expansion was the dominating 
investment (OECD 2003). The growth in Seed is partly because of recent established 
government funds. 
 
 
Figure 7: Source: NVCA, H1 2007 
 
2.5 Who supplies the capital? 
The main reason why investors choose to invest in VC is the prospect of a profit supreme to 
other investments. As information about VC investments is hard to find, it is difficult to say 
whether this actually is the case. Unlike publicly traded companies, most venture backed 
firms are not listed anywhere, and they face few requirements to publish information.  
 
 Almost all the investors (limited partners) are institutional (such as banks, insurance 
companies and mother companies) and have a portfolio perspective when investing in the 
venture capital sector. This justifies a VC investment even if the profit from venture capital is 
not supreme to other investment opportunities.  
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Figure 8: Source: NVCA 
 
In Norway, the general partner side of the private VC sector is dominated by a few major 
players such as Ferd, Northzone, Verdane and Teknoinvest.  In total there are 41 companies 
currently engaged in either the seed phase or the start up of VC (NVCA), but several of these 
are minor players without significant invested amounts.  
 
Only a small minority of the general partners in the Norwegian VC market are foreign (figure 
9). In the first half of 2007, 82.1 per cent of funds raised came from Norway, and only as little 
as 3.1 per cent was from investors outside of Europe (NVCA).  
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Figure 9: Source: NVCA 
 
 
2.6 Who receives the venture capital? 
VC is used as a source of finance for companies which cannot get traditional bank credit.  
When the company is too risky or the entrepreneur is too wealth constrained, they have no 
other choice than to give up certain control and cash flow rights through an equity sale in 
exchange for the cash needed to develop the firm.   
 
2.6.1 Target sectors 
Norwegian venture capital investments reflect the overall strength in recourse based industries 
and the developed information and communications technology (ITC) clusters. ITC has 
maintained its position as the strongest sector for years. But benefiting from the research and 
innovation capabilities accumulated through exploitation of the oil reserves in the North Sea, 
we see more and more successful start-ups serving the oil and gas industry. All other sectors, 
except Life Science & Biotech, are laggers (see figure 10). A traditionally strong (in an 
international perspective) VC sector such as retail and consumer service is surprisingly 
underrepresented in the distribution of  Norwegian venture capital compared to other 
countries.  
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Figure 10: Source: NVCA 
 
During the last years, the importance of active ownership has been highlighted. VC firms are 
good examples of such owners. They have, as said, different types of special knowledge 
which adds value to the company when used properly. Hence, venture capital is not just a last 
way out for a company in need of cash, but also a possibility to ensure the best possible 
development of the company. In many cases it is more profitable for the entrepreneur to share 
a big company with the VC firm, than to own a small company by himself. A small bite of a 
big pie could be larger than a big bite of a small pie. 
 
Although the amount of capital committed to VC has increased during the last years, there is 
still an unsatisfied demand for more capital in the market. For each company the VC investors 
decide to invest in, they reject a huge number in a thorough screening process. It is not 
thereby said that all of these are companies with enough potential to attract capital in a larger 
market, but some would certainly be found investment worthy if the investors had more cash 
available.  
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3. Theory presentation 
In the broad specter of venture capital theories, several views on optimal financial contracts 
have been proclaimed. Some argue that the same mechanisms (e.g.  convertible securities) 
allocate both necessary cash flow rights and control rights (Marx (1998) and Berglöf (1994) 
amongst others). However, Gompers (1997) and Hellmann (1998) claim that the allocation of 
cash flow rights can be separated from the use of control rights by the use of covenants. We 
have chosen to structure our theoretical approach based on this perspective.  
 
The cash flow rights are distributed based on an ex ante knowledge of the possible future 
scenarios. The question answered by the cash flow rights is “what should be divided and how 
it should be divided between the shareholders”. Control rights on the other hand, are included 
in the contracts to distribute the authority to make decisions in the possible scenarios which 
cannot be predicted ex ante. They do not answer the question “which action should be taken”, 
but describes “who shall decide which action to take”. 
 
This structure allows us to separately analyze each group of mechanisms and thereby 
providing a clearer picture of their influence in the principal-agent problem, a central issue in 
the theory of venture capital financing. Although we have chosen to separate the two types of 
rights, an important feature of venture capital contracts is the complement of their respective 
effects. The correct combination of cash flow and control rights is crucial in order to design a 
well functioning contract.  
 
In order to clarify the theory presented, we have included an imaginary case example which is 
presented in box 1 to box 5. 
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3.1 Cash flow rights 
The most analysed and debated issue in venture capital contracting theory is the double-sided 
moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. In the different 
stages of the contracting relationship various incentive problems arise. In order to maximize 
the total payoff, both parties have to exert a certain amount of managerial effort, which is 
dependent on the individual share of the total proceeds. Hence, cash flow rights play a crucial 
role in the structuring of an optimal contract. The cash flow rights are determined by the 
financial structure of the start-up. It is important that the financial claims satisfy the different 
needs for incentives. First, we will discuss different approaches and findings related to the 
double-sided moral hazard problem and how it affects the structuring of optimal financial 
claims. Second, we will turn to the principal-agent relationship between the venture capitalist 
(principal) and the entrepreneur/manager (agent). In this relationship the issue of managerial 
remuneration is crucial. The discussion will be motivated by a comparison of pay-
performance sensitivity between various remuneration factors. Finally, other important cash-
flow related contractual mechanisms observed in venture capital contracts will be covered. 
 
3.1.1 Optimal financial claims 
The most common approach is that the entrepreneur is wealth constrained and thus requires 
not only advice but also external financing, Schmidt (2003), Repullo and Suarez (2003) 
among others. However, Casamatta (2003) does not use the assumption that the entrepreneur 
is initially wealth constrained, and analyse the trade off between outside financing and 
sufficient incentives for the entrepreneur. Casamatta rely on the assumption that the more 
efficient agent (i.e. the entrepreneur) would not ask the less efficient for advice unless the 
latter invests a proportion of his wealth into the business. However, the outside investment 
must not exceed a given level, because then the entrepreneur’s part of the proceeds will be too 
small. Introducing the assumption of a wealth constrained entrepreneur (more or less aligned 
with the findings of Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) forces the entrepreneur to accept a high 
level of outside financing. This implies that other strong incentives must be provided to the 
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entrepreneur. Casamatta’s solution is to issue common shares to the entrepreneur and 
participating preferred shares
1
 or convertible bonds to the venture capitalist.  
 
TechNova is a newly founded company within the ICT sector. Their aim is to launch a new 
communications service within the Norwegian market. However, this service is dependent upon a 
government concession. The founders of TechNova are all scientist currently employed at the 
University of Bergen. In the start-up process a research fund connected to the university 
contributed to the required funding. 
After a while, TechNova sees the potential of commercialising their product ideas. In order to 
achieve that, they need more capital and business knowledge for further growth. But the 
founders are wealth constrained and inexperienced. TechNova addresses the venture capital 
market. The venture capitalist VentureCo finds TechNova interesting, and decides to invest effort 
and capital. The ownership structure of the company after the investment:
The new issue consists of 20 B shares (B = preferred share with conversion right). The founders  
original A shares (A = common shares) are called ”founders share”, and are subject to certain 
restrictions.
Case example: Founding of TechNova AS
Number of ordinary
shares
Cash invested 
Founder 10 100
Research Fund 10 100
Total 20 200
Number of 
ordinary shares
Cash invested Value of shares
Founder 10 A 100 500
Research Fund 10 A 100 500
VentureCo 20 B 1000 1000
Total 20 A + 20 B 1200 2000
 
Box 1 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Participating means a preferred share that in addition to preferred dividends also pays an additional dividend 
when common share dividends exceed a specified amount. NB! Casamatta does not use the name 
“participating”. 
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Without debt claims the preferred shares are first in the pecking order of cash claims, hence 
the payoff profile equals a debt claim. Common shares are only valuable when business are 
good (to the right of the dashed line in figure 1 (a)), which induce the entrepreneur to work 
hard. Issuing different financial claims to the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur creates a 
deviation in optimal risk exposures between the two parties. The entrepreneur becomes the 
residual claimant, consequently seeking a higher risk profile (figure 1(b)). Only outcomes in 
the upper half of the probability distribution
2
 are profitable for the entrepreneur. Hence, the 
entrepreneur prefers to increase the risk exposure (), which increases the probability for 
higher exit values in the right tail. In figure 11 it is assumed that maximum leverage is used, 
i.e. the face value of the debt claim equals expected exit value: 
 
 
Figure 11        (a)                  (b) 
    
 
Green (1984) applies convertible securities to mitigate the problem of excessive risk taking. 
The idea is that a convertible security reduces the entrepreneur’s payoff for very good profit 
realizations and thus makes excessive risk taking less attractive (Schmidt, 2003, pp. 1141). 
 
                                                     
2
 Assumed normal distribution. Probability density function:  
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In the continuation of our discussion we will follow the analytical structure of Schmidt (2003) 
and Repullo and Suarez (2003). Both articles structure their analysis as a sequence of events. 
However, they differ somewhat in chronology and structure. We have to some extent merged 
the two models and outlined a new one (figure 12), which we believe is more aligned with 
empirical findings (Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) among others). More specifically, we have 
included the possibility of an expansion investment used in Repullo and Suarez (2003). But 
instead of allowing the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to choose level of effort 
simultaneously, we have followed Schmidt (2003) and assumed that the entrepreneur provide 
his effort investment before he know to which extent the venture capitalist will contribute. In 
the next paragraph we will explain the model in full. 
 
 
Sequential occurrence of events 
 
 
Figure 12 
 
3.1.1.1 The model 
Initially the venture requires a start-up investment (I0), before a signal on potential future 
profitability occurs (). This signal can be verifiable, and thus incorporated as a contingency 
for the expansion investment (I1). However, if the signal is not verifiable, the accumulated 
investment must be agreed upon in the initial contract. Examples on verifiable signals might 
be an approval of a drug or a new government concession. Non-verifiable signals are signals 
that are subject to manipulation or other uncertainties, e.g. entrepreneur/manager opinion or 
economic indicators. In this model we assume that the signal is verifiable. After the expansion 
investment both the entrepreneur (E) and the venture capitalist (VC) must choose their level 
of effort investment (a and b, measured by their costs). The efforts are regarded as 
complementary (a + b), hence, maximizing the expected total proceeds ((a, b, )) means that 
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both parties must exert a high level of effort. When choosing the level of effort, both the 
initial and the expansion investment are sunk and the parties are locked in by the mechanisms 
of the contract. We apply a theoretical model where an expansion investment is incorporated, 
because according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) the majority of venture capital 
investments in the US are divided into separate stages dependent on the achievement of 
milestones. 
 
Following Schmidt (2003) we simplify the model and distinguish three signals on potential 
profit scenarios , and three corresponding actions of the venture 
capitalist . For each scenario the net total surplus is given by:  
 
                (1)  
We define the first best efficient investment level which are assumed to be unique and given 
by: 
 
      (2) 
       
We define the three possible states of the world in the same way as Schmidt (2003).  
means that the expected value of the venture is in the range of a “high flyer”3 and the future 
prospects are very bright. In this case, the venture capitalist should follow up with an 
expansion investment and boost its effort in order to reap the maximum payoff. Action b = bs 
is chosen. If state  = m occurs, the venture is expected to be a “living dead”
3
 and the venture 
capitalist should not spend more time and effort than needed in order to repay the claim from 
the initial investment, b = b0 which we normalize to zero. Finally, if worst case scenario 
occurs  = , the most efficient choice for the venture capitalist is to exercise his control 
rights and liquidate the venture, i.e. b = bc where: 
 
0 = b0 < bc < bs 
 
State of the world:  Ex ante probability: 
Good       
 
  p 
                                                     
3
 Industry jargon.  
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Medium    q 
Bad        (1 – p – q) 
  
Where: 
0 < p, q, (1 – p – q) < 1 
 
 
After the investment, the relationship between VentureCo and TechNova develops further, and 
VentureCo’s understanding of TechNova improves.  The invested amount is used to develop the 
product idea and applying for the concession.  At a point in time, the result from the application 
process is published. This can be interpreted as a verifiable signal of TechNova’s future 
profitability. The possible signals are:
If the concession is approved, it is possible to commercialise the product if they follow up with an 
additional expansion investment and both the founders and VentureCo contribute with their full 
effort potential . The founder’s effort is to transform the idea into a product and most important 
in the early phase. VentureCo’s effort is active participation in management decisions and use of 
their wide knowledge network, and is important in the commercialisation of the product.
If TechNova is not awarded the concession, but chosen to be sub-contractor, the concession 
owner can make use of their ideas in return of a fixed fee. An additional investment does not add 
value to TechNova. The transforming of the idea into a product is to a certain extent useful, hence 
the founders make an effort. However, the product is not going to be commercialised by 
TechNova, and VentureCo does not exert any effort.
If the concession is denied, VentureCo exercises it’s control rights and liquidates the company.  
VentureCo makes an effort in closing down TechNova.
Case example: The possible outcomes of TechNova’s future development
Signal Outcome
θ Consession approved High flyer
θm Sub-contractor to consession owner Living dead
θ Consession denied Liquidation
 
Box 2 
 
If the bad state occurs E cannot be forced to pay more than , due to the crucial and quite 
realistic assumption that he is protected by limited liability. In order to attract venture capital 
financing the total surplus from the venture must be sufficient to cover the debt claim from 
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the venture capital investor. The surplus if the good signal occurs (expected to be a “high 
flyer”) is unknown, however, recall that a “living dead” will repay the debt claim, something 
which implies that also a “high flyer” will. For a given investment level the face value of the 
debt claim (D) must fulfil the equation I0 = D(p + q) + (1-p-q) in a competitive equilibrium. 
Rearranging the equation and finding an expression for D (right side in inequality (3)). We 
end up with the following financing constraint: 
 
   (3) 
          
Note that the initial financing decision is only dependent on the start-up investment (I0) and 
not the size of the expansion investment (I1). Because when the decision point of the 
expansion investment is reached the VC has already verified the signal (), and therefore 
know whether the follow up investment would be profitable or not. 
 
Other important assumptions are that a and bs are complements at the margin. From this 
follows that the marginal surplus with respect to a, increases if the venture capitalist chooses 
effort bs instead of b0. However, in the bad state a and bc are substitutes at the margin and a 
change from  to bc reduces the marginal surplus, with respect to a, to zero. This 
implies: 
 
  
 
 
3.1.1.2 Introducing convertible securities 
The purpose of this analysis is to show that a convertible security (C, K, ) with the right 
features implements the efficient investment choices. A convertible security is more flexible 
than a straight debt or equity claim. Because the VC can make a choice at a date t, specified in 
the initial contract, based on the state of the world. He can either choose to be repaid K and 
receive  per cent of the equity in the venture, or receive a payoff equal to a fixed amount C + 
K. K can be interpreted as other debt claims without conversion rights. Recall that at good 
signal will trigger an expansion investment, and to reap the benefits of the “high flyer” upside 
VC will choose to convert. E and VC payoffs are given by: 
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R
E 
 = ((a, b, ) – (C + K) – a  if VC does not convert   (4) 
  ((1 - )(a, b, ) – K – a  if VC converts 
 
 R
VC
 = ((C + K) – b – I0  if VC does not convert   (5) 
   ((a, b, ) + K – b – I0 – I1 if VC converts 
 
In order to get an understanding of the factors included in the convertible security (C, K, ) 
we will relate them to the financing constraint (3) previously explained, and formulate a 
financing constraint applicable for the convertible security: 
  
 First, the face value of the debt claim: 
  
 Debt claim: 
          
 (6) 
 
 Optionally converted into  percent of the equity at a date t: 
  
  
 Where  is: 
          
 (7) 
 
It would never be optimal to let the VC gain control of the entire post conversion equity (< 
1). To see why, recall the discussion regarding the most efficient effort in the different states 
of the world: 
 
Substitute (6) in (7) and presenting it as an inequality:  
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Must be satisfied because:  
           
      
       (I) 
          (II) 
It is not optimal that the VC converts the debt claim in the medium state. 
Because I is strictly larger than II,  has to be strictly smaller than one. If not, 
the VC will choose to convert. 
   
A post conversion equity ownership less than 100 per cent (< 1) is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). 
 
Second, K represents, as already mentioned, other non-convertible debt claims and must also 
be incorporated in the financing constraint. Based on (3) the financing constraint applicable 
for the convertible security (C, K, ) is: 
 
       (8) 
 
3.1.1.3 Mechanisms of the convertible security 
In order to see the mechanisms of the convertible security (C, K, ) we will in the following 
paragraph go through the outcomes of the different states.  
 
In the bad state (): 
 
        (9) 
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This implies that the VC does not follow up with the expansion investment, because E will 
never be able to repay the initial debt (total surplus is strictly smaller than C + K). Hence, E 
chooses a = 0, which is the efficient choice. By not exercising the conversion option the VC 
will hold a debt claim and thus get all the returns of the project (because the value of the 
venture would not exceed the debt claim, see figure 3). Moreover, his efficient choice is 
liquidation (bc) with a payoff  . 
 
 
Note: The grey shaded area is an intermediary state, which is not possible in the model. 
According to the assumptions the surplus in a good state will always cover the expansion 
investment cost. However, this is not too far from the real world, because a venture tends to 
either be a success or a complete fiasco. 
Figure 13 
 
If the medium state occurs (m), the VC will choose not to convert if (recall payoff function 
(5)): 
 
     (10) 
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For a given effort a(m) the total realization of the investment (a(m), b0, m)  will equal (C + 
K) (see figure 3). According to (3) and (8), a(m) is strictly smaller then a*(m). Hence, there 
are three possible scenarios. Recall that it is efficient for the VC to exert effort b0 in the 
medium state of the world. 
 
i) E can choose a < a(m) and thus not be able to repay his debt. Furthermore, the VC should 
not exercise his option to convert.  
 
ii) Effort a(m) < a <a*(m). E can cover the debt claim, however, (a, b0, m) + K – I < (C + 
K) – I. And it is not efficient for the VC to convert the debt claim into a share  of the equity. 
Illustrated in figure 3; the dotted VC equity share line is below the debt claim line for all 
values of (a, b, ) in the medium state. 
 
iii) a > a*(m), this option reduces the total surplus (recall the maximization definition (2)) 
while the VC’s claim still equals (C + K) (figure 4 illustrates E’s payoff). Hence, this level of 
effort will never be optimal. 
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Note: The grey shaded area is an intermediary state, which is not possible in the model. 
According to the assumptions the surplus in a good state will always cover the expansion 
investment cost. However, this is not too far from the real world, because a venture tends to 
either be a success or a complete fiasco. 
Figure 14 
 
In the good state  a debt contract would not induce the VC to invest bs, because his payoff 
will still be (C + K). However, an opportunity to convert C into a share  of the equity would 
induce the right incentives if the conversion option is profitable. The VC will exert bs if (from 
payoff function (5)): 
  
  
  
 If VC converts: 
      (11) 
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Note that in the good state,  includes both initial and follow up investment ( ), 
hence not the same value as in the bad and medium state. However, this will not affect the 
outcome of the model. 
 
Assume that E exert  and substitute (7) into the payoff function (5): 
 
     (12)
                   
 By choosing bs and converting, the payoff will at a minimum equal the debt claim less an 
effort b0 (normalized to zero), for . 
 
But this does not fully explain why (11) should hold, only the fact that VC will prefer to 
convert. In order to induce VC to exert a high level of effort,  must be sufficiently large to 
make it worthwhile to exert bs. VC’s part of the post-conversion equity () must exceed: 
 
       
 (13) 
 
 
But is it rational to assume that E will choose   ?  
From equation (12) we derive the logic that an effort  prevents the VC from 
converting, because then the converted payoff will be less than the debt claim. Furthermore, 
exerting bs is not an optimal choice. However, this is not an efficient outcome. If they are 
willing to renegotiate the terms of the initial contract, a better solution for both parties can be 
achieved. E will never, as stated earlier, choose a level of effort below   where 
  (see figure 14, a (a, b, ) below (C + K) will leave no payoff for E). 
And the venture capitalist will by no means accept a new contract with a return less than C + 
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K – I.  is E’s part of the renegotiation surplus ( ). E’s payoff after 
renegotiation (based on (4))
4
: 
 
   (14) 
  
 
The explanation of this inequality is that if the entrepreneur’s effort is less than   but 
higher than , the total surplus becomes smaller while the return to the venture capitalist 
does not decrease, hence not an optimal alternative. 
                                                     
4
 Schmidt (2003), pp. 1164, includes intermediary calculations. 
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We assume that TechNova was awarded the government concession, and the follow up 
investment was made. After the follow up investment (the issuing of 20 new B shares), the 
ownership structure of TechNova looked like this:
After five years TechNova has grown considerably, and is in need of additional funding an a 
different corporate structure. VentureCo and the initial founders decide to list TechNova on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. According to the contract this is a qualified IPO which is considered a 
deemed liquidation (for explanation, see glossary). The deemed liquidation triggers a conversion 
of B shares into common shares. Before the conversion, the B shares receive their preferred 
amount which in this contract is equal to the invested amount.  The total proceeds from the IPO is 
14 000. Examplified below:
Case example: Realisation of the results
Number of 
ordinary shares
Cash invested Value of shares
Founder 10 A 100 500
Research Fund 10 A 100 500
VentureCo 40 B 2000 2000
Total 20 A + 40 B 2200 3000
Percentage 
shareholding
Preferred 
amount
Proceed from 
common shares
Total payoff
Founder 1/6 0 2000 2000
Research
Fund
1/6 0 2000 2000
VentureCo 2/3 2000 8000 10000
Total 1 2000 12000 14000
 
Box 3 
 
3.1.1.4 Summing up  
A convertible security with the following features will provide a first best solution in all states 
of the world:  is chosen such that the VC is compensated for investing bs and that the option 
is profitable only if E invests at least . However, changing the chronology of the effort 
investments, e.g. the entrepreneur and the VC invest their effort simultaneously, a convertible 
security will no longer implement the first best investment incentives, even though it still 
35 
 
dominates standard debt-equity contracts. Nevertheless, relating this to the real world, an 
assumption that E’s effort is invested previous to the VC’s effort investment is not too far 
fetched. Because E often has the strongest impact on the venture in early stages and VC may 
be more important at the expansion stage.  
 
3.1.2 Window dressing 
The expansion investment is dependent on the “potential profitability signal” (recall figure 
12). And the venture capitalist may choose to liquidate or not exert a high level of effort if he 
receives a low or medium profitability signal. This option induces the entrepreneur to 
manipulate the distribution of the signal before it is realized, in order to increase the 
probability of a positive signal. Manipulating the signal does not mean that the actual quality 
of the project is improved, hence, this change constitute a conflict of interest between the 
entrepreneur and the VC. This phenomenon is called “window dressing”. 
 
Window dressing is in general a value reducing activity. By staging the investments the 
entrepreneur is induced to focus on short-term objectives instead of providing the VC with 
quality information for optimal long-term investments. Hence, the conflict of interest is based 
on the future actions of the entrepreneur. In some cases this can prevent profitable projects 
from being financed altogether. Many articles discus this issue, e.g. Green (1984) concludes 
that a mix of convertible securities and debt is superior to straight debt when it comes to 
mitigating the problem of the entrepreneur engaging in excessive risk taking. Aghion et al. 
(1994) focus on debt and equity claims with renegotiation, and show that a pre-specified 
bargaining procedure spurs an efficient outcome. However, none of these explain the use of 
convertible securities combined with stage financing which, according to Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003), are so common in venture capital financing. To cover the phenomenon of 
“window dressing” we have chosen to follow Cornelli and Yosha (2003)5.  
 
Suppose that between the start-up investment and the realization of signal  the entrepreneur 
has an opportunity to affect the signal distribution. By increasing the probability of observing 
 and reducing the probability of observing  without actually affecting the probability of a 
                                                     
5
 The notation and the model are transformed into the same format applied in figure 12. Hence, it deviates from 
Cornelli and Yosha (2003). 
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high value outcome ((a, b, )), the entrepreneur may convince the VC not to apply its 
control-rights and liquidate the venture in the short-term. From the VC’s point of view, 
window dressing should be prevented by all means, because the liquidation/refinancing 
decision is thus based on lower quality information. And distorted information will reduce the 
value of the VC’s option to abandon the venture6. Furthermore, in order to mitigate the 
window dressing problem, the mechanisms used in the financing contract should ensure 
appropriate cash flow rights in each state of the world. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) prove that 
there is a convertible security (C, K, , ) with these features. By constructing a convertible 
security such that in equilibrium the VC (Cornelli and Yosha (2003), pp. 14); 
 
 provides I0 
 liquidates the project after observing  < , but not otherwise 
 does not convert any debt after observing  
 converts the maximal amount of debt allowed (C) after observing  
 
Recall that this is a convertible security with the same mechanisms as the one presented in the 
“Optimal financial claims” introduction paragraph. In addition, Cornelli and Yosha (2003) 
introduce an extra factor , which is important in this setting. The conversion ratio  combined 
with  play a key role in the construction of the contract. A suitable conversion ratio must be 
chosen to provide the VC with the right incentives. Low values of  imply that converting the 
debt claim into equity is relatively cheap and for high values, the VC will not convert, 
because it is relatively expensive. Whether the conversion ratio is considered low or high, 
depends on the level of . Increasing  means reducing the entrepreneur’s share of the post 
conversion equity and the incentive to window dress becomes lower. Hence, the combination 
(, ) will still be effective even for a higher . The entrepreneur will not pursue window 
dressing if he knows that it will prompt conversion and cause a loss that cannot offset the 
advantage from the fact that liquidation is less likely to take place. 
 
                                                     
6
 The option to liquidate equals a put option, and inaccurate information regarding the underlying asset reduces 
the value of the option. 
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3.1.3 Managerial remuneration 
In the principal-agent relationship between the venture capitalist (principal) and the 
entrepreneur/manager (agent) the issue of managerial remuneration is crucial. In the following 
section we will focus on the remuneration “package” offered to entrepreneurs/managers and 
discuss the effects on incentives. 
3.1.3.1 Pay-performance sensitivity 
So far we have discussed the use of cash-flow rights as a measure to achieve efficient 
investment and managerial incentives. And it is almost regarded as a truism that higher levels 
of equity and cash are equal to better incentives. But the degree of incentives generated by 
various cash and equity claims depend on which measure is used, and even more importantly, 
which measure is believed to be correct. Baker and Gompers (1999) have analysed the CEO 
equity ownership and its implications, for both venture capital-backed and nonventure capital-
backed pre-IPO firms. Interestingly, in their sample
7
 venture capital-backing reduce CEO 
equity ownership from an average of 35 per cent to 19 per cent. At a first glance these results 
might seem a bit peculiar, since VCs are known to pay considerable attention to managerial 
incentives. However, as mentioned earlier, it depends on how the levels of incentives are 
measured. So instead of just increasing the cash payout and the equity holding, the focus 
should also be directed towards the so-called pay-performance sensitivity of the remuneration 
factor. Pay-performance sensitivity is typically defined as the change in CEO wealth 
associated with a one per cent change in shareholder wealth (elasticity). Thus, it is important 
to look at both measures because low equity ownership in percentage terms does not 
necessarily mean low incentives. 
 
In general, there are four main sources of CEO remuneration: Equity holdings after IPO (e), 
options (o), salary (s) and shares sold (sa). Each remuneration factor differs in their pay-
performance sensitivity (i, ie, o, s, sa). So in order to calculate the total pay-performance 
sensitivity (or elasticity
8
) () of an incentive “package” the weighted average is used. And the 
weights are the fraction of total CEO remuneration that each factor represents
9
. 
 
                                                     
7
 Initial sample 1,553 firms (1,120 nonventure capital-backed and 433 venture capital-backed) that went public 
between 1978 and 1987. This is arguably an old sample. After elimination; 1,011 firms where used in the 
analysis.  
8
 x,y  (per cent change in x / per cent change in y) 
9
 The notation follows Baker and Gompers (1999) 
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        (15) 
 
CEO pay from sales of shares is not included in the weighted average equation because sa= 
0. The least sensitive factor of the remaining is salary. s is difficult to estimate and affected 
by many variables, nevertheless, we approximate it to be close to 0.1
10
. This number is not 
very precise, however, it is considerably lower than the other elasticities in equation (15). The 
elasticity of equity holdings (e) equals 1.0, obviously because increased share price equally 
affects the equity holding of the management (the entrepreneur) and the other owners (VC 
etc.).  When it comes to options the issue is more complex. Based on the option delta ()11, 
the Black-Scholes value of the call option (c) and the share price (P) the option elasticity is 
computed as follows: 
 
           (16) 
 
The option elasticity is typically greater than 1.0, thus, measured by pay-performance 
sensitivity this remuneration factor yields the most high-powered incentives. In fact, there are 
also several other dimensions that affect the delta. In risk management it is common to talk 
about the “Greeks”12 (delta is one of them), however most of them are outside the scope of 
this discussion. But we will briefly include the vega (price sensitivity to change in volatility), 
or more precisely how the volatility () of the share price affects the delta. This measure is 
called the vanna
13
 and can be interpreted as the sensitivity of delta to a unit change in 
volatility. For a call option the vanna is strictly positive, which imply that the pay-
performance sensitivity for call options in high-risk companies will be greater than for low-
risk companies. 
 
Relating this discussion to the venture capital industry, it would be intuitive to believe that 
options are widely used in managerial (or entrepreneurial) incentive “packages”. Hereunder, 
the risk exposure and lack of liquidity to fund extensive salary payouts in start-ups. Options 
                                                     
10
 Reported in past studies of large firms, Baker and Gompers (1999), pp.16 
11
 Delta () measures the sensitivity to changes in the price of the underlying asset.   
12
 ”Greeks” is a collective term used for the parameters representing the market sensitivities of derivatives. 
13
 Vanna , Wystup (2006). However, the ”Greek” name vanna is not widely used for this parameter. 
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would be a “cheap” way of providing sufficient pay-performance sensitivity. This intuition is 
somewhat aligned with the findings of Baker and Gompers (1999). They find that options are 
a slightly higher fraction of total CEO remuneration in venture capital-backed than in 
nonventure capital-backed companies. However, for both samples the percentage is quite low 
and not significantly affecting the total pay-performance sensitivity. Directing the attention 
towards the total pay-performance sensitivity, venture capital-backed CEOs have moderately 
more sensitive pay, although the differences are not significant. Solely based on a risk 
perspective, these findings somewhat contradicts the view of most principal-agent models. 
E.g. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) conclude that the pay-performance sensitivity of a 
manager’s compensation is decreasing in the variance of company return. This is most likely a 
result of principals (investors) not wanting the agents (managers) to take on unnecessary risk 
exposure. However, Aggarwal and Samwick (and most principal-agent models) used a sample 
of large public traded corporations, and it is important not to “compare apples with pears”. In 
the VC industry other parameters prevail. To our knowledge no empirical analysis is 
conducted on this issue within the VC industry. 
 
Designing the perfect incentive “package” one should in theory also incorporate dimensions 
such as implicit incentives, company specific factors (size, industry etc.) and control rights. 
We would not dig deeper into the implicit incentive dimension than just reporting the findings 
of Gibbons and Murphy (1992). They report that measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth 
to shareholder wealth, incentives are increasing in CEO age, but unrelated to equity 
ownership. Control rights and their relationship to cash flow rights, and hence incentives, are 
extensively covered in the next chapters. 
 
3.1.4 Other CF related contractual mechanisms 
3.1.4.1 Automatic conversion  
A possible add-on to the debt conversion right is automatic conversion. Automatic conversion 
is applicable when the signal on interim performance is verifiable. Hence, the conversion can 
be exercised when a pre-specified milestone has been achieved. If the signal is not verifiable 
it will be impossible to relate the automatic conversion to a contingency and it will not 
prevent the entrepreneur from window dressing. By instead giving the VC an option to 
convert, the debt-equity structure will also be flexible to new unexpected information, a 
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feature that is necessary to prevent window dressing in incomplete contracts environments. 
An interesting finding by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) is that a large percentage of the VCs 
in their sample use both automatic conversion and conversion options contemporaneously. 
The automatic conversion clause is usually linked to well-defined verifiable signals, such as 
an IPO. While interim performance signals do not seem to be considered verifiable enough, 
hence the use of conversion options with the right to convert during the lifetime of the project. 
So why is automatic conversion provisions widely applied? It seems that it is an efficient way 
to prevent major debt overhang and hold-up problems by early investors. An automatic 
conversion provision in a way withdraws the seniority rights of early investors, thus, opens up 
for new capital investments. Verifiable milestones such as IPOs often spur structural changes 
and make the company appealing to new types of investors. And in order to attract these new 
groups of investors efficient redemption of old claims is necessary. 
 
3.1.4.2 Anti-dilution provisions  
Anti-dilution provisions are important mechanisms for investors to protect the value and 
influence of their investments. They protect against subsequent offerings at lower prices, as 
well as adverse changes in corporate structure. Many venture capitalists view anti-dilution 
provisions as a necessity for them in order to provide sufficient investments, however, from 
the perspective of the entrepreneurs such provisions are often viewed as unfair and an 
obstacle for subsequent investors. There is no logic that favours one side, because both are 
more or less right in their proclaimed views. Consequently, this conflict of interest is often 
intensely debated and the outcome tends to depend on the bargaining power of the different 
parties. This “give and take” process has resulted in various degrees of anti-dilution 
provisions being applied. But in general there are two main variants; full ratchet and weighted 
average. 
 
A full ratchet provision fully compensates the investor if there are subsequent down rounds. 
The conversion price for the initially invested convertible preferred shares is ratcheted down 
to the lowest price at which new shares are being issued. For example, if the next round of 
financing is for a price that is half of the first round price, the conversion price of the original 
preferred will be cut in half so that the original preferred investors will receive twice as many 
common shares upon conversion (Marino, 2005, pp. 2). 
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A weighted average ratchet provision will, if a down round occurs, only partly compensate 
the initial investor. In this case the conversion price of the initially issued preferred shares is 
set equal to the weighted average of conversion price prior to new issuance and price per 
share of new issue. Summarised in the following formula
14
: 
 
  
  
x = applicable conversion price following new issuance. 
 x
1
 = applicable conversion price prior to new issuance 
 y
1
 = number of shares of common share outstanding prior to new issuance. 
 y
2
 = number of additional shares of common share issued in new issue. 
 x
2
 = price per share of new issue. 
 
Two subtypes of the weighted average ratchet provision is narrow-based and broad-based 
ratchet. The difference is in the interpretation of y
1
. A narrow-based ratchet provision 
incorporates only common shares outstanding, however, the broad-based incorporates also all 
convertible securities, warrants and options. 
 
From the explanation above it is rational to expect the venture capitalist to push for a full 
ratchet provision, something, which the entrepreneur certainly will oppose because a full 
ratchet provision might be an obstacle when attracting other new investors if they do not 
receive the same provisions. But an even more hard-hitting argument is that a new offering 
will dilute the existing common shareholders, which often is the management team (or 
entrepreneur). Nevertheless, will it always be optimal for the venture capitalist to pursue this 
strategy? Recall the previous discussion regarding incentives in a venture-financing contract. 
In order to induce the entrepreneur to exert an optimal level of effort he must receive a part of 
the possible upside in the venture, i.e. own a sufficient fraction of the equity. This condition is 
not fulfilled if the dilution effect is too severe. 
 
In the end, the respective parties bargaining power seem to determine the level of anti-dilution 
applied. According to Marino (2005) there are four dominant factors affecting the level of 
bargaining power; how desperate the company/issuer is for capital, the inexperience of the 
                                                     
14
 Marino (2005) pp. 2 
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management team and its advisors, the inability of the company/issuer to attract capital and 
the current market environment. Arguably the most important of those four factors is the 
market environment. An interesting example is the use of full ratchet versus weighted average 
provisions in the San Francisco Bay Area from Q2 2002 to Q3 2006 (Fenwick and West, Q1 
2004, Q3 2004, Q3 2006). Remember that Q2 2002 was the first quarter after the burst of the 
high-tech bubble and capital available for new venture investments plummeted. As a 
consequence, VC bargaining power increased. In the following years the economy picked up 
speed again, and as more and more money poured into the Californian high-tech venture 
industry the negotiating leverage shifted towards the issuer/entrepreneur. To illustrate the 
development we have used the Nasdaq-100 index (Yahoo!finance) as an economic trend 
benchmark and graphed it together with the percentage use of full ratchet and weighted 
average provisions over the respective period (figure 15). It is interesting to see that the use of 
full ratchet (weighted average) provisions decrease (increase) in correlation with the 
underlying market trend. The residual percentage is quite stable and represents the fragment 
of the sample where no anti-dilution provisions were used. 
 
 
Source: Fenwick and West, Q1 2004, Q3 2004, Q3 2006 and Yahoo!finance 
Figure 15 
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3.2 Control rights 
An entrepreneur seeking capital is always facing the same problem; should he issue voting equity or 
debt? While equity reduces the influence and power of the entrepreneur over the company through 
dilution, debt increases the risk of bankruptcy which will lead to a loss of the entire firm.  
The importance of control right distributing mechanisms is described by Kirilenko in his 
article from 2001: “If it does not exist a mechanism to distribute control rights, then 
investment does not take place, information relevant to the project’s pay-off is not revealed 
and risks are not shifted from a risk-averse entrepreneur to a risk-neutral investor.” This 
means that without the mechanisms distributing the control between entrepreneur and 
investor, there will be made no venture capital investments. 
 
In this section, we will first look at the distribution of control rights with a modified version 
of Aghion and Bolton’s model from 1992. Then we will go on presenting and analyzing 
different types of control right mechanisms used in venture capital contracts. 
 
3.2.1 Distribution of control rights  
3.2.1.1 The model 
For VC, there are alternatives to giving E the correct incentives at all times. One option is to 
allocate the control rights so that E has no choice other than to follow VC’s will. The model 
used to describe the control right allocation of different type of contracts is based on Aghion 
and Bolton’s article from 1992. We have made adjustments regarding several aspects of the 
model, to ensure that it is compatible with the model used to describe CF rights.   
 
Utility: VC: Interested in monetary results, r 
E: Interested in both monetary results and private benefit,   
r = final period return 
a = action taken (Not to be confused with a in the previous model. Here the action a 
can be taken by both E and VC, and does not refer to E’s effort) 
l = private benefit  
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The state of nature, S, is costly or impossible to observe. Hence it cannot be contracted upon. 
Ex post it is easy to identify. The signal θ on the other hand is publicly verifiable. As it is 
positively but imperfectly correlated with S, it can be used for contracting purposes. The 
monetary returns are all verifiable.  
 
Assumptions 
1. There are two states,  
 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) are assuming only two possible states of nature, good and 
bad. To stay in line with the previous model, we fit the old assumption of three states 
into the new model. Initially, we are assuming that there are three possible states; 
good, medium and bad with three corresponding signals;  . However, 
when working with control rights we can merge good and medium to be the state 
good, and let the new bad state correspond to the bad state used in the earlier model. 
The same applies to the corresponding signals. 
 
To see how we can make these assumptions, let us have a closer look at the two states 
of Aghion and Bolton’s model: In , the VC has no desire to intervene with the 
management’s running of the company. In relation to the previous model, this can be 
seen as letting the company live, which is VC’s choice in state good and medium. As 
those two states here require the same action, they are merged into the same category. 
 
In the bad state, the VC will choose to interfere. This interference has negative 
impacts on E, and can therefore be seen a parallel to liquidation, which is the VC’s 
choice if the bad signal occurs 
 
2. There are two actions,  
, VC does not interfere; E decides which action to take. 
, VC interferes and controls the choice of action. 
 
The interference of VC can take several forms. It can be changes in management, 
organizational changes, new business plans etc. What they have in common is that 
they reduce the private benefit of E, hence E does not want VC to interfere.  
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3. There are two signals,  
 = 0 is a signal of the bad state and θ = 1 is a signal of good state. 
 
We fit the old assumption of three signals ( ) into the new model with two 
signals the same way as we did with the states of nature. We merge good and medium 
into the new good signal,  and set the new bad signal equal to the old 
bad signal, . 
 
 
 = the probability of the signal good given that we are in 
the good state 
 
 
This means that when there is a good signal, there is a greater probability of ending up 
in the good state, and vice versa when the signal is bad. 
  
 
4. There are two final period results:  
 
The probability of good result given state  and action . 
Private benefits:   is defined as private benefits in state  given action  
 
   
First best pair of actions  
   
   
 
When we have a good state of nature (S=1) the sum of monetary returns and private 
benefits is larger when the action chosen is to keep letting management run the 
company. On the other hand when the state is bad, the sum of monetary returns and 
private benefits is larger when VC interferes. 
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5. The financing constraint:  
G is defined as the probability of ending up in the good state. Corresponding to 
the previous model that gives:  
 
Figure 16 presents sequentially how the model works. First the investment  is made. Then 
the players observe the signal θ, and based on the signal, and action a is taken. In the end the 
players observe which state they are really in, and the result is realized.  
 
Sequential occurrence of investment process events 
 
Figure 16 
 
 
 
 
Ex ante contracts are incomplete. This opens up for renegotiation after experiencing the true 
state S. All the ex ante contracts have: 
 
I. Management compensations schedule. 
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The VC receives all the residual income, and E gets a transfer which is a function of 
the signal and realized returns:  
 
 If the signal is verifiable, the transfer can be made contingent on the choice of action a: 
  
 
In the model used to describe the optimal financial claims, the manager is seen as the 
owner, not like here, as an employee. There is no transfer of wealth from VC to E. For 
our analysis, that does not matter. What we are interested in is how E and VC’s wealth 
changes with state of nature and choice of action. The effect those two parameters 
have on payoff are the same in both models.  
 
  
II. Control allocation rules. 
The control rights can be individually or jointly distributed between the two parts. If 
the rights are individual, one part gets the exclusive right to decide which action to 
take. 
   
 If the rights are jointly distributed, we can describe them like this:  
 is the probability that either E or VC gets the right to decide which 
action to take given state S when the control rights are joint.  
 
   and  
  Where  for some S 
  
If , then one part has exclusive rights to exercise control and we 
are back to the case of individual rights. 
 
When control rights are joint, we need simultaneous actions to avoid hold-ups. 
The process of renegotiation in such contracts goes like this:  After realizing 
the state, S, E makes a “take it or leave it offer” to VC. If VC accepts, the 
action desired by E is taken. If the VC refuses E’s offer, a hold-up (or stand 
still) will occur, reducing the final period profits to 0 (r=0). 
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We will now examine the distribution of control rights both when the actions are verifiable 
and when they are not. 
 
3.2.1.2 When actions are not verifiable 
 When the actions are not verifiable, we basically have to different types of contracts, 
unilateral and contingent. The unilateral contracts have individually distributed control rights 
like described in the section above. The contingent contracts are made contingent on the 
signal θ. 
 
We will look at three different scenarios to find out how the control rights should be allocated 
to maximize the chances of reaching a first best scenario.  
 
 
When should E have control? 
What about a situation where E has the control rights, and there are ex. post renegotiation? 
Since there are only two final period results, 0 and 1 the transfer function will look like this: 
 
 
E chooses his actions dependent on the signal to maximize his payoff: 
 where  and  
 
When  differs from the first best action , there might be room for renegotiation. 
Assume that   and  are such that without renegotiation, E’s choices would be   when 
θ=1 and  when θ=0. If the signal says good (θ=1) but we end up in a bad state (  there 
is certainly scope for renegotiation.  
 
 
Before the renegotiation the payoffs (R) of VC and E are as follows: 
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E offers the VC the same payoff as before, but his own payoff will rise to: 
    
 
And because of assumption 4: , his new profit is higher than the old. E 
knows that VC will accept his offer, because VC’s alternative is a hold-up which will give 
him a payoff equal to 0. This shows that when E has the control rights and there is an ex. post 
renegotiation, we will always end up with the first best action being taken. 
 
But the problem here is that when a wealth constrained E has the control, the VC often does 
not get a high enough payoff. This means that the rationality constraint of the VC is broken,  
, and the project will not be financed. Hence, entrepreneur-control might 
not be such a good alternative after all.  
 
However, sometimes entrepreneur-control is a good thing. It is obvious that when E’s private 
benefits are comonotonic with the total revenue ( ), control rights 
allocated to E will lead us to a first best scenario. But as the objectives are difficult to know, 
the utility function of E remains unknown, and the VC cannot verify whether E’s objectives 
really are in line with his own. 
 
But when the private benefits of E are not comonotonic with the total revenue (for example if 
) the VC can no longer rely on E to take the first best action. To ensure that, E will 
have to be compensated, either through the transfer function or through renegotiation, enough 
to always want to choose the first best action in both states. The problem, however, is that the 
requirements of E are not possible to combine with the requirements of VC. In some cases 
there will not be enough proceeds to satisfy both parties. 
 
 
 
 
When should VC have control? 
Like with E, when the VC’s incentives are perfectly in line with the total revenue (i.e.  when 
monetary benefits are comonotonic with total revenue,  
, VC-control ensures first best action being taken.  
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When monetary benefits are not comonotonic with total revenues, E’s wealth constraints 
might prevent him from getting VC to choose the first best action. Suppose we are in a 
situation where    and focus on contracts where . In the state , the VC will 
not choose  unless , because . E must then offer VC a share 
of his monetary transfer that is high enough to compensate VC for the loss he suffers when 
switching to first best action . So unless the original transfer share belonging to E is large, 
or the difference in monetary payoff between  and  is small, E’s wealth restrictions 
keeps him form offering a Pareto-improving contract to VC. So, for VC-control to ensure the 
first best alternative, E cannot be subject to strict wealth restrictions, or VC’s potential gain 
from deviating from first best action must be small. 
 
When is contingent control the best option? 
When neither E- nor VC-control ensures that first best action will be taken, it is possible to 
write a contract where E gets the control contingent on one signal and VC gets the control 
contingent on the other signal.  
 
Assume that neither private nor monetary benefits are comonotonic with total benefits, 
 and . Then first best action will be taken under VC-control only in  and 
under E-control only in case of . Since S is unobservable, we cannot contract upon it. What 
we can observe on the other hand, is the signal θ. If θ is more or less in correlation with S, the 
contract can be written so that VC achieves the control if θ=0 and E if θ=1. This will 
approximate, but not ensure (unless S and θ are perfectly correlated) first best action being 
taken.  
 
 
 
 
In their article, Aghion and Bolton (1992) conclude that when neither monetary nor private 
benefits are comonotonic with total benefits, there are values of such that: 
 E-control is not feasible 
 VC-control is not first best efficient 
 Both the unilateral control allocations are dominated by contingent control 
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Going back to the time of contract negotiations, when VentureCo and the founders of TechNova 
argued about the distribution of control rights, several issues were heavily debated.
The founders demanded  shared control of the use of VentureCo’s knowledge network. They 
argued that without a proper use of the network, the possibilities of realising the potential value 
of TechNova would be reduced. VentureCo did not agree to this and argued that their incentives 
were comonotonic with total profit: The only situation where the network adds value to 
TechNova is if they are awarded the concession. In that case both VentureCo and the founders 
profit from using the knowledge network to increase the value of TechNova, hence providing 
VentureCo with the unilateral right to decide whether or not to use the network, ensures the 
optimal outcome.
VentureCo wanted control over the use of the product idea. But the founders were afraid that 
increasing VentureCo’s control would not prevent the venture capitalist from benefitting form the 
idea behind the founders’ backs. For example by founding a start up, owned 100 per cent by 
VentureCo, using the same product idea to compete for the government concession. The reason 
for the founders worries was that misusing the product idea is a non verifiable action, which is 
not comonotonic with TechNova’s total profit. VentureCo understood the founders worries and 
they agreed upon a contract where VentureCo was granted the control right over the use of the 
idea contingent upon the government concession.  Once the concession is awarded, only 
TechNova can make use of it, and the product idea has limited value to others.
Case example: Distributing the control rights when actions are not verifiable
Distribution of rights Example
Comonotonic with total  
profit 
Founders decide
Founder’s effort in 
transforming idea to 
product
VentureCo decides
Use of knowledge 
network
Non-comonotonic Contingent control The use of the idea
 
Box 4 
 
3.2.1.3 When actions are verifiable 
 When the actions are verifiable, the initial contract can include how control rights should be 
transferred contingent on actions taken by E and VC. We can also write contracts which 
prohibit the execution of certain undesired actions. This way the VC can reduce E’s 
negotiation power, and thereby not having to alter the contract later to avoid hold-ups.    
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Do we need a contract with restrictions when there are only two possible states? When the 
actions are verifiable, the monetary transfer from VC to E can also be contingent on the 
choice of action, . When second period return has two values (0 and 1), we can 
write:      
 
Assume further that private benefits are not comonotonic with total revenues, so that E-
control is not dominating.  Then we can assume that .  We denote  ( ) E’s share 
of the monetary returns when action  ( ) is taken, and signal θ is realized.  
 
Then we can compare the two contracts, restricted and contingent. The contract with a 
predetermined action plan directly specifies the action to be taken given the signal. The 
contingent contract indirectly specifies the action to be taken through the expected action 
chosen by the controlling part. 
 
Up front we know that in state  , E will always choose  whereas VC will prefer  as 
long as the ex ante transfer of monetary result is such that   for all θ.  
 
Predetermined contract:   if θ = 1  
     if θ = 0 
 
Contingent contract:  Control to E if θ = 1 
    Control to VC if θ = 0  
 
 
As long as the signal is strictly unbiased, there is no difference between the two contracts. But 
when signal and state do not match, we can observe the difference. If θ=1 in state , E 
chooses  if  is sufficiently high. This is different from the predetermined contract which 
would have led to . Consequently, we can get more flexible action plans through the 
contingent contracts than predetermined ones.  
 
If we extend our model to three different action, , where the first best actions 
for the two states remain unchanged, and action  is Pareto-dominated by  and  in both 
states. We further assume that , and that  so that  has a high 
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private benefit even though it is sub-optimal.  In this case a contingent contract would give E 
the control if the signal is good (θ=1). He would then prefer  in the case of a bad state (θ=1, 
) and receive the large private benefits. This would reduce VC’s payoff to zero. In order to 
get E to choose  instead, he would have to give away the entire monetary benefit. To avoid 
this situation, VC could include clauses in the contract, which prevents E from taking action 
. That would have secured him a minimum payoff larger than 0. 
 
VentureCo demanded to have a redemption right included in the contract (see glossary,  
redeemable shares), but the founders were worried that VentureCo would choose to terminate 
TechNova even though the future potential is still strong. In the end, the parties agreed that if no 
qualified IPO (contingency) has been achieved within five years, VentureCo would be granted the 
right to demand redemption. 
For the founders, it was important to ensure that VentureCo would always be represented by one 
of the partners on the board meetings. The partners have knowledge and valuable insights which 
will benefit TechNova if they are present when descisions are made. Without restricitons, a 
partner with a seat on the board could choose to attend the meetings in person, send a solicitor 
or simply not show up at all. He will never choose not to attend  (or not send a solicitor), as 
VentureCo would lose significant influence. Attending in person ensures maximal influence, but 
consumes valuable time. Sending a solicitor might be a satisfiable solution. It ensures a certain 
level of influence and does not take up his time. 
They agreed upon a structure where VentureCo recieved board seats contingent on investment, 
however with a restriction; the partner must personally attend the board meetings.  
Case example: Distributing the control rights when actions are verifiable
Number of possible 
actions
Distribution of rights Example
Two Contingent Redemption rights
More than two Contingent w/restrictions Board rights
 
Box 5 
3.2.1.4 Summing up 
When seeing the characteristics of venture capital in the lights of this model, there are some 
control right structures which stand out as more appropriate than others. As E is wealth 
constrained, the probability that VC’s financial demands cannot be met with E-control is high. 
This takes us in the direction of either contingent- or VC-control.  
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The main question is whether the actions are verifiable or not. We believe that both types of 
actions can be found. There is a high degree of moral hazard in VC financing, but still there 
are some actions which are verifiable. With a functional reporting system and verifiable 
related variables (such as different key performance indicators), the share of verifiable actions 
will increase. That goes for the VC’s actions as well as for the actions of E. 
 
We therefore expect to see control rights distributed not as a unilateral decision, but more in 
the line of contingent contracts where VC has a higher level of power than E.  As there are 
generally more than only two possible actions, we also expect to see a certain degree of 
restrictions put on E by VC. Of course, the extent to which the two parties get more or less 
control rights will also depend on their negotiation power and case specific factors.   
3.2.2 Control right mechanisms 
When looking into control rights, we use the same principles as Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2003), dividing the rights into four sub categories: Voting rights, board rights, liquidation 
rights and redemption rights. In addition there are certain other aspects of a contract which 
affect the control rights but cannot be fitted into one of the four categories above. We have 
chosen to label them other rights.   
3.2.2.1 Voting rights 
Most decisions regarding a company’s actions are based on majority, and voting rights 
therefore provide one measure of control rights. The higher percentage the VC achieves the 
more influence he has over the company. Kaplan and Strömberg find in their article from 
2003 that in the US, VC has a voting majority in more than 50 per cent of all the venture 
backed companies (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). 
 
Dependent on the complexity of the company’s financial structure, different shares can have 
different voting rights attached to them. The main boundary of share dependent voting rights 
is the jurisdiction. In most western European countries the law clearly states that each share 
shall have one vote. 
3.2.2.2 Board rights 
Another aspect of majority control is the board rights. In most companies there is a fixed 
relationship between voting power and board power, but this is not always the case.  Kaplan 
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and Strömberg distinguish between the normal board rights (the board rights or composition 
of the board at the completion of the contract) and adverse state board rights (the board rights 
or composition if the company reaches an adverse stage). The definition of adverse state 
depends on contingencies which will be further explained later. 
 
When composing the board, we can distinguish between three kinds of board representatives; 
those representing VC, founder and the external board members. VC and founder can freely 
choose their proxy on the board of directors. Furthermore they have to agree upon whom is 
going to fill the board seat(s) reserved for external representatives.  
 
In their research, Kaplan and Strömberg find that VC is less likely to have board majority than 
voting majority. They also find that the board control of VCs does not tend to increase with 
the number of financing rounds. It is commonly observed that the board has been given 
several veto rights, and there are strict limitations to what management can do in terms of 
investment and changes in corporate strategy without the approval of the board. It may be so 
that the investor representatives have veto rights which other board members do not have. 
This is a mechanism used by the VC to ensure that the company is being run according to his 
wishes.  
3.2.2.3 Liquidation rights 
The right to liquidate the company is a mean for the investor to ensure repayment. It works as 
a disciplining factor for the founder, as he knows that in case of underperformance, the VC 
can liquidate his company. And given that VC has a claim that is senior to the claim of the 
founder
15, there is a possibility that the founder won’t receive any payment at all. This gives 
the founder incentives to increase the value of the company. Both to keep the VC from 
liquidating, but also to ensure that he will be paid in case of a liquidation. 
3.2.2.4 Redemption rights 
The right of redemption is the right to demand that the company buys back the investor’s 
shares at a fixed price. This right is usually made contingent on certain conditions. As with 
liquidation rights, this is an option for the VC to get his investment back when the company 
fails to achieve a successful exit within a fixed period of time. For the investor, a redemption 
rights equals having a long put on all his shares from the founders/company. 
                                                     
15
 Kaplan & Strömberg (2003); The claims of the VCs in liquidation are typically at least as large as the original 
investment. This is true in 98% of the financings. 
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3.2.2.5 Anti-dilution 
Anti-dilution is one of the mechanisms which directly affects both CF rights and control 
rights. The aspect of control rights through anti-dilution is a matter of pre-emption rights on 
new share issues. That is, when an investor has pre-emption rights, he has the right to 
maintain at least his percentage ownership in the company by participating up to his pro-rata 
holding. His participation will be based on the same conditions as all other investors. When 
the new offering is based on a share price lower than the prior price of the investor, there are 
certain anti-dilution agreements which can kick in, and change the price at which the investor 
buys. This is the CF rights dimension of anti-dilution. 
 
In most cases there are several exceptions from the pre-emption right. When issues are made 
for anti-dilution purposes, exercise of warrants or as a part of an employment share program 
(ESOP), pre-emption does normally not apply.  
3.2.2.6 Other mechanisms 
There are several, somewhat less important mechanisms which do not fully fit into the main 
categories. These have in common that they affect the distribution of control rights, and most 
of them must be seen in light of the following paragraphs about contingencies. 
 
Vesting is a mechanism regulating the founder’s right to his earned shares/options. The extent 
to which he has the right to sell/exercise is regulated by milestones. When using milestones, 
the founder gains ownership and control of his own shares/options as the milestones are 
reached, for example, when he has been employed by the company for a certain time. This is 
a way for the VC to ensure that critical competence stays within the company. It is also 
proved that when the founder’s payoff depends on the final financial outcome of the 
company, the probability of value destroying behavior (which is possible due to the presence 
of asymmetric information) is smaller (Hellmann, 1998) 
 
Non-compete and non-solicit clauses are observed in most venture capital contracts
16
. These 
clauses regulate the employee’s right to work for competitors of the company. This is a way 
for the VC to increase his bargaining power and keep the founder from holding-up a later 
financing round. As many of the venture backed companies are depending on the knowhow 
and skills of the founders, there would be a substantial loss of value if he decides to leave. 
                                                     
16
 Kaplan & Strömberg: Non-compete clauses are used in approximately 70% of the portfolio companies.  
57 
 
And especially if he was to become a threat to the company, either by starting up for himself, 
or by joining an existing competitor. 
 
Tag along, also known as co-sale right, has the effect  that when one share owner chooses to 
dispose of his shares, the other share holder with a tag-along right has the right to sell an 
equivalent part of their shares to the same buyer and subject to the same conditions as the 
original seller. This reduces the liquidity of the share, and helps prevent sale of shares to 
outside investors so that the VC’s relative control rights remain the same. 
 
Drag along or bring along is an obligation for all share holders to sell their shares to a 
potential buyer when certain shareholders, normally the VC or all holders of preferred shares, 
have approved the sale. This makes the company easier to sell, as many buyers of small 
companies demand a 100 per cent ownership. There are usually requirements for the purchase 
offer to trigger a drag along. The bid must normally be in either cash or liquid shares and not 
require the VC to give any warranties or remain in any way obligated to the buyer.  
 
ROFR means Right Of First Refusal, and is the right for all shareholders to purchase a pro-
rata share of all the company’s shares being sold by any of the other investors. ROFR can 
reduce the market value of the shares, as many investors will not make an offer on shares 
when another part has the right to acquire them before him. 
3.2.2.7 Staging 
As explained under the non-compete and non-solicit clauses, the effort and knowledge of  E is 
crucial to the venture backed companies. The E is an inalienable resource (Neher, 1999) and 
cannot be contractually bounded to work. Although there can be consequences for the E if he 
decides to leave (vesting), he still has the right to terminate his working relationship with the 
investor. If he chooses to do so, the investor is left with the material values of the company. 
When the financing is staged, i.e. the company receives its financial support in smaller 
portions spread over time, it is so that the more of the company’s value that is associated to 
the presence of the E, the larger bargaining power does he have in later financing rounds.  
 
For a company to gain value and eventually be sold (either as a trade sale or through an IPO) 
the value of the entrepreneur must be embodied in the company. This embodiment happens 
over time as the business plan is realized and the product of the company is taking shape.  To 
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prevent the entrepreneur from holding-up negotiations, the staging should be outlined in a 
way which always allocated the negotiation process to a time when the entrepreneur’s power 
has just been reduced. The entrepreneurs bargaining power is reduced by significant 
developments in the company such as patent approvals, closing of important deals, production 
of a prototype etc.  
3.2.2.8 Contingencies  
In order for contingencies to have any effect, there must be some verifiable factors on which 
the contingencies can be based (recall discussion about automatic conversion). Possible 
underlying factors are output, performance of different kinds or actions made. Contingencies 
are especially important what stage financing regards.  The contingencies, upon which the 
contracts are written, can be totally independent of cash flow, but still be a measure of 
financial performance.  
 
Vesting is an example of a mechanism which can depend on several different factors. Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2003) find examples of vesting based on different factor such as product 
functionality, patent approvals and time employed. 
3.2.2.9 Summing up, control right mechanism 
When used correctly, the mechanisms described above lead to a distribution of control rights 
which is Pareto optimal (Kirilenko, 2001).When the level of control rights given to the 
investor is high enough to prevent principal-agent problems and an entrepreneur gives up 
control and thereby looses utility, it is not so that the investor correspondingly increases his 
profits. Therefore the investor will not demand a higher degree of control than he needs, since 
he then has to compensate the entrepreneur. By minimizing the investor’s costs and the 
entrepreneur’s loss of utility, we will reach a Pareto optimal stage, where the entrepreneur 
retains as much control as possible, and the investor completes the venture finance deal with 
the highest possible payoff. If there is competition in both the VC and the entrepreneur 
market, this state can be reached through bargaining processes.  
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4. Analysis 
The theory presentation in the previous chapter outlines, to some extent, optimal structures for 
venture capital contracts. However, these structures are based on several assumptions and do 
not necessary fit into a real-world context. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) compare 
characteristics of US venture capital contracts to financial contracting theory, and they 
conclude that real-world contracts are somewhat more complex than existing theories predict. 
To our knowledge no such comparison has been made for Norwegian contracts, and neither 
have we tried to pursue such an extensive empirical study. Nevertheless, we have analysed a 
sample of contracts and in the following chapter outlined the main mechanisms applied. 
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These mechanisms are discussed in the light of relevant financial theory and findings from the 
US venture capital industry.  
 
4.1 Data sample 
4.1.1 Sources 
The Norwegian VC market is a small market with rather few participants, and information 
requirements from the authorities are limited due to the fact that the portfolio companies are 
privately owned. This causes a low level of transparency, hence, information gathering is 
difficult without the cooperation of the venture capital investors. External sources, such as 
public databases and previously conducted research are few, because the Norwegian venture 
capital market is immature and still limited in size. However, the Norwegian Venture Capital 
Association was founded in 2001, and every year since they have published membership lists 
and industry analysis.  
 
Gathering data, we contacted the members of NVCA asking for access to information about 
their ongoing and previously conducted transactions and the respective contracts. We received 
an answer from approximately 50 per cent of the members. However, two thirds of the 
respondents were negative due to confidentiality issues or lack of either time or resources. 
Eventually, only four of the positive respondents were willing to provide all of the requested 
information and opened up for further dialogue. From these four companies we ended up with 
a sample of 15 venture capital contracts. We have outlined a checklist organising the 
contractual provisions according to the structure used in this thesis (i.e. cash flow rights and 
control rights. Example attached in appendix I). Each individual contract was analysed step by 
step by applying one respective copy of the checklist. In the end, all observations were 
summed up. From the aggregated results, we observed the main features of the contractual 
mechanisms used. The results are presented on an aggregated level due to confidentiality 
agreements. Since our sample of venture capital firms is limited (only four), an extensive 
table explicitly illustrating the results cannot be presented, as people with industry specific 
knowledge could possibly identify individual firms and transactions. 
 
Our sample of contracts represents the three largest venture capital sectors; life science and 
biotech, information and communication technology (ICT) and oil and energy. Referring to 
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figure 10, these three sectors are by far the most important in the Norwegian venture capital 
industry. 
 
4.1.2 Criticism 
The NVCA industry analyses are based on voluntarily submitted questionnaires, hence, the 
level of accuracy and objectivity cannot be guaranteed. Still, NVCA is the information 
provider with the deepest and most extensive knowledge of the Norwegian industry. 
 
Even though our sample of contracts represents the most important sectors, the total number is 
too small to provide us with statistically significant results. But as the approach in our 
analysis has more of a qualitative than a quantitative character, statistical significance is not 
crucial. 
 
With only four companies represented in the sample, there is a possibility that our findings are 
biased by company specific factors, and thus do not represent the mechanisms most 
commonly applied in the Norwegian venture capital industry.  
 
4.2 Cash flow rights  
4.2.1 Financial claims 
4.2.1.1 Liquidation preferences 
When structuring a financial contract there are numerous financial claims available to 
investors, and in the mezzanine
17
 category the only constraint seems to be creativity. 
However, from the previously outlined theory only, convertible preferred shares or 
convertible debt to VC and common (ordinary) shares to the entrepreneur induce optimal 
behaviour and investment incentives. This is aligned with our findings. Even though the 
structure is not always the same, all contracts use an element of convertible securities. The 
most common are convertible preferred shares. But note that without a more senior debt 
claim, the convertible preferred payoff, and hence the provided incentive, equals a convertible 
debt claim. In venture capital jargon the financial claims are known as liquidation 
                                                     
17
 Non-conventional funding that shares characteristics of both debt and equity (BusinessDictionary.com) 
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preferences
18
. From the preferred share category we observe two sub-groups: Full 
participating and simple participating. These refer to the liquidation preference attached to a 
specified class of preferred share when the residual payoff (remaining proceeds after all debt 
and preference claims are covered) is divided between the owners of the venture. Relating it 
to the theory discussion, full and simple can be viewed as two different levels of . 
 
A full participating provision includes the preferred shareholder on the same level as the 
ordinary shareholder when sharing the residual payoff, i.e. the remaining proceeds are 
distributed pro rata among all shareholders (figure 17). In practise, after receiving the 
preference amount the preferred shares are converted into ordinary shares on a one to one 
basis. 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
A simple participating provision implicitly include a “catch up” given to the ordinary 
shareholders (entrepreneur/management), thus reducing the VC’s fraction of the residual 
                                                     
18
 The liquidation preference is a right which can be required by venture capital investors in recognition of the 
risk they bear on their capital contribution (BVCA, pp. 10)  
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payoff (figure 18). The “catch up” provides the ordinary shareholders with a right to receive a 
catch up amount before the pro rata distribution of the residual payoff. The observed size of 
this catch up amount varies from contract to contract. Most likely, the observed amount in 
each contract is a result of the VC’s prediction of required incentives for each individual 
entrepreneur. 
 
 
Figure 18 
 
In our sample we most frequently observe a full participating provision. There might be 
several reasons to that. Recall the double-sided moral hazard problem from the theory 
presentation; both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist need proper incentives in order 
to exert an optimal level of effort. And as seen from figure 17 and 18, both full and simple 
participation provide double upside incentives. However, the simple participation provision 
represents a lower  because of the catch up. And a lower  not only increases the 
entrepreneur’s incentives, but also the probability of window dressing. By choosing a full 
participating provision, the VC discourages window dressing because the “punishment” for 
signal manipulation is more sever. One important remark is that window dressing comes as a 
consequence of staging. As mentioned in the theory chapter, the entrepreneur manipulates the 
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signal in order to achieve short-term goals such as continued financing (next stage). All 
contracts in the analysed sample are from early stages in the financing cycle, hence mostly A 
and B preferred classes (some C and D) where window dressing is a more severe problem. 
Several levels of preferred classes are used in order to retain seniority for early investors and 
to differentiate when it comes to control rights. 
 
Liquidation preferences are generally triggered by a liquidation event (explained in the next 
paragraph). However, there might also be cash flows from the venture before a liquidation 
event. Most mature companies usually pay dividends to their shareholders, but companies in 
need of cash, such as start-ups and expansion ventures, do not pay regular dividends. 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), 43.8 per cent of the companies in their sample 
pay so-called cumulative preferred dividends. These are not regular dividends paid with 
predetermined intervals; instead, the dividends accumulate and are added to the preferred 
liquidation claim. This makes sense since most ventures are in constant need for cash due to 
high growth and investment rates. Nevertheless, this is not reflected in our findings. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the analysed contracts include preferred dividend payments, but 
none of them apply cumulative dividends. Interestingly, this observation is not entirely true, 
because in several contracts the entire preferred claim could be interpreted as cumulative 
preferred dividends. By digging deeper into the various preferred claims applied, we find two 
different structures; accumulation of a percentage rate each year (generally reflecting the cost 
of capital) and x times initial investment (x equals one or two) when liquidation preferences 
are triggered. The accumulation of a percentage rate each year is somewhat equal to 
cumulative preferred dividends, thus some contracts use an implicit cumulative preferred in 
addition to regular. The difference is that whether to pay a dividend or not must be voted upon 
every year, while the preference claim is decided during the contract negotiations. Hence, 
changes in bargaining leverage and control rights throughout the investment period might 
make a difference to the end result. 
 
4.2.1.2 Liquidation events 
An important function of a venture capital contract is to clarify when the liquidation 
preferences are valid. On one side the VC endeavours the possibility of an easy and profitable 
exit, and on the other side the entrepreneur seeks the possibility of attracting fresh investors in 
future stages of the company’s development. In the analysed sample of Norwegian VC 
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contracts we have observed several events that trigger liquidation preferences, so-called 
deemed liquidation. All contracts include at least two of the following: Initial public offering 
(IPO), Merger and acquisition (M&A), trade sale (disposal of a company’s shares), sale of 
assets, change of control. They are all well-defined verifiable events, hence, according to the 
theory a suitable signal for automatic conversion. In the majority of the observations, 
automatic conversion works implicitly through the liquidation events and the full/simple 
participating provision. However, in the cases where the liquidity preferences equal 
convertible debt claims, specific automatic conversion clauses are stated. A peculiarity is that 
very few contracts include specific criteria concerning what is a qualified IPO or a qualified 
M&A. Moreover, some do not even specify what is meant by “sale of assets” or “change of 
control”. In general, those who demand a qualified IPO use criteria such as; valuation 
exceeding a minimum threshold and only offerings on an approved stock exchange. A “sale of 
assets” event is usually identified by a sale of all or a substantial amount, “trade sale” by a 
sale of more than 50 per cent and “change of control” by a transfer of more than 50 per cent 
of voting power. The most frequently used liquidity event is “sale of assets”. 
 
4.2.1.3 Redemption 
Another perspective, which also concerns the VC, is the possibility of an exit if the venture 
does not prove to be a success. Recall from the theory presentation of control rights, that a 
provision called redemption enables the VC to reclaim a part of its investment by selling its 
shares back to the company. The cash flow perspective of this provision is υ, which from the 
theory represents the remaining value when the entrepreneur is protected by limited liability. 
Because of various judicial aspects, the redemption amount is often subject to restrictions, 
nevertheless, it can be viewed as a minimum recovery amount for the VC (figure 19illustrates 
full participating with redemption and figure 20 simple participating with redemption). And 
hence, in a certain way reflects υ.  
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Figure 19 
In the analysed sample, 50 per cent of the contracts applied redemption provisions. The 
majority were restricted to redemption first after a period of five years. This five years period 
strengthen the theory assumption regarding a floor limit on the redemption of the VC 
investment. Owing to the fact that if the venture still operates after five years, it is more likely 
that it could fulfil a possible redemption demand. On the contrary, if the burn rate
19
 is too high 
and the expected (future) value creation is low, a floor limit is nonsense, because the venture 
will then obviously not be able to buy back any shares. A very interesting observation, 
however only in one contract, was a minimum threshold cancelling out redemption provisions 
if the value of the venture dropped below. This provides to some extent a downside coverage, 
but also in a way adapts to the fact that if the venture investment completely fails, there is no 
possibility for a buy back. 
 
                                                     
19
 The rate at which a company is consuming cash each month (BVCA). 
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Figure 20 
 
4.2.1.4 Anti-dilution 
Analysing the use of anti-dilution provisions is a rather complex task. As previously 
mentioned in the theory chapter, there are no initial arguments that bring us to an obvious 
solution. Both sides have rational arguments for their views. Nevertheless, there are some 
indicators that could be used to assume reasonable outcomes. We have tried to indicate that 
supply and demand of risk seeking capital affects the bargaining power of the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur. Something, which ideally should make us capable of assessing 
whether the appropriate anti-dilution provisions are applied or not in our sample. By 
appropriate we mean in favour of the strongest party. From our observations there are no 
systematic changes over the sample period (1998 to 2008). However, there is a strong bias 
towards weighted average. Out of those who apply anti-dilution protection, only one out of 
four apply full ratchet. This is in line with the findings of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) (US, 
December 1986 to April 1999), but higher than the numbers reported by Fenwick and West 
(San Francisco Bay area, Q2 2002 to Q3 2006, see figure 15). It seems that the most 
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important factor affecting whether a provision is applied or not is the venture capitalist. Some 
do not use it at all. In total three out of five contracts use anti-dilution protection. 
 
In the theory presentation the anti-dilution protection was exercised through a change in the 
conversion ratio. But in our sample the majority (approximately 40 per cent) implemented 
such protection by issue of warrants. We find that warrants usually are combined with issuing 
a number of shares to nominal value, and sometimes the investor can even choose between 
the two. Other mechanisms more or less randomly applied are cash payments and nominal 
share issuance without warrants. 
 
So how do the observed anti-dilution protections affect cash flows? We can conclude that in 
the analysed sample there are three different directions; full ratchet, weighted average and no 
protection. Some contracts use a provision called “pay or play” (sometimes referred to as “pay 
to play”), which means that the existing investors either participate in the new round (play) or 
become diluted (pay). Recall from the theory that full ratchet preserve investor’s ownership 
percentage and value in all down rounds, thus the venture capitalist’s cash flow will not be 
affected. But on the other side, the existing common shareholders (in this case the 
entrepreneur) will be heavily diluted. If a weighted average protection is used, both the 
venture capitalist and the entrepreneur will be diluted. The venture capitalist less severe than 
if no protection is used and the entrepreneur more severe than with no provision but less than 
with a full ratchet (figure 21). Note that in figure 21 it is assumed that the new investors 
receive ordinary shares with lower seniority than the initial venture capital investor, hence it 
only affects the pro-rata sharing of the residual proceeds. To a certain extent, seniority 
protection is aligned with our findings, however, we observe that expansion investments most 
frequently are financed by issuing new classes of preferred shares and not ordinary shares. 
This will also affect the VC payoff function to the left of the “preference claim” in figure 21. 
Of course, the dilution effects only apply if the existing owners do not participate in the new 
offerings. 
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0: Prior to subsequent investment round. 
I: Full ratchet provision. 
II: Weighted average provision. 
III: No protection at all. 
Figure 21 
 
So far we have focused on the effects of the different anti-dilution provisions and how 
frequently the various types are observed. In the following we will try to explain our 
observations. Above we mentioned bargaining power and the fact that there are no observable 
differences across the time period. Even so, the majority of the contracts are written after the 
burst of the high tech bubble, an interval with, on average, high growth and increasing 
investment rate. This is a very weak explanation and is more in the category of guessing than 
explaining. Another and perhaps better explanation could be that the venture capitalist are 
afraid of fully diluting the upside incentives for the entrepreneur. Recall that full participating 
was the most frequently observed liquidation preference, hence the upside incentives for the 
entrepreneur is already weakened and further incapacitating will probably evaporate them. 
This leads us to the question whether there is a link between on one side full participating and 
weighted average and on the other side simple participating and full ratchet. From the size of 
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our sample, this question does not receive a fair answer, however, logically it seems that it 
should be some kind of interconnection due to the upside incentive issue. Finally, there is still 
one more thinkable explanation; according to VentureOne (2005), 64 per cent of all anti-
dilution provisions in the US are cancelled in subsequent financing down rounds and the 
remaining 36 per cent do often not work as they were supposed to. They explain their findings 
by the fact that if the applied anti-dilution provisions are to effective, no new investor will 
accept the terms, especially in down rounds. Rationally, new investors refuse to suffer 
because the initial investor did a bad investment. Hence, it is no use agreeing upon a full 
ratchet protection if it is not sustainable. 
 
4.2.1.5 Summing up: The most frequently observed structure 
Based on the combined findings for all cash flow right provisions, we have in the following 
paragraph outlined the most frequently observed structure. As illustrated in figure 22, it 
consists of a full participating liquidation preference and a redemption floor, with a weighted 
average anti-dilution protection. However, this is not completely in line with the conclusions 
from our theory analysis. Recall the illustration of the payoff diagram from the optimal 
combination of financial claims in figure 13. Figure 13 presents an intermediary step between 
the point where the value of the venture equals the face value of the debt claim and the 
preferred conversion point. This horizontal interval is not a part of the payoff function of a 
full participating preferred share. Instead, it seems to look like the payoff function of a simple 
participating preferred share with redemption (figure 20). This leads us to the question 
whether the most frequently observed payoff structure provides first best investment 
solutions? The criteria from the theory chapter are: The venture capitalist’s post conversion 
payoff must compensate him for exerting his optimal amount of effort, and the conversion 
option is profitable only if the entrepreneur exert his optimal amount of effort. Certainly the 
venture capitalist will be compensated, because his upside payoff is higher with a full 
participating provision. But the question is whether the entrepreneur’s incentives are powerful 
enough to induce him to exert his optimal amount of effort?  
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0: Prior to subsequent investment round. 
I: New investment round with weighted average anti-dilution provision. 
Figure 22 
 
4.2.2 Pay-performance sensitivity 
In the theory presentation of pay-performance sensitivity, we discussed the different parts that 
are commonly included in a remuneration package: Equity holdings after IPO, options, salary 
and shares sold. We exclude shares sold since its pay-performance sensitivity is equal to zero. 
Salary is observed in all contracts and is the main remuneration factor, however, with a quite 
low elasticity, its impact on total pay-performance sensitivity is minimal. Equity holdings 
vary considerably among the different observations in our sample. Hence, we cannot highlight 
a general impact from this remuneration factor. Approximately 50 per cent of all contracts 
include employee share option plans (ESOP). ESOPs consist of a pre-specified percentage of 
all issued shares, which are reserved for share option grants to current and future employees. 
In general, entrepreneurs and managers with significant shareholdings are often excluded 
from the ESOP. If this is the case, it would certainly not affect the pay-performance 
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sensitivity of the remuneration package. Pay-performance sensitivity is a rather complex issue 
and our data is not detailed enough to come up with good predictions of the pay-performance 
level in our sample of venture capital contracts. We consider this as an important issue in the 
structuring of optimal venture capital contracts; hence, pay-performance sensitivity is 
thoroughly discussed in the theory section. 
 
4.3 Control rights 
4.3.1 Voting rights  
Although we observe frequent use of different share classes (such as A, B, C and D shares), 
the contracts have that in common that all shares have equal voting power. There is one vote 
attached to each share, independent of share class. The Norwegian Companies Act permits 
restrictions on voting rights for different classes of shares or share owners, but we have found 
no contracts where this has been used. One explanation could be that in the corporate 
governance literature, it is considered good corporate governance to operate by the one vote 
per share rule. This might result in consensus among the players in the industry, and lead to 
self for filling expectations.  
4.3.2 Board rights 
In our material, we find that an average board of directors consists of 5.4 members, with the 
smallest boards having only 3, and the largest board of directors having as many as 7 
members. The Companies Act states in §6-1 that a company with more than three million 
NOK in share capital has to have at least three board members. This applies to all of the 
companies in our sample, and is probably the reason why we do not observe any companies 
with a smaller board of directors than 3 members. 
 
The companies with more than 5 members on the board often have a higher number of 
investors. Therefore they also need to have a larger board of directors in order to give the 
investors the board seats they demand. 
 
When the board of directors is gathered to vote on which action to take, it is clear to everyone 
present, who votes in favor of which proposal and which action is being taken in the end. 
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Hence, actions are verifiable and we expect some kind of a contingent control right allocation, 
possibly including one or more prohibitions. 
 
It is obvious that the board rights cannot be unilaterally distributed. If the rights were to be 
given to one party, there would in reality be no need for the board of directors. Then the party 
with control rights would do just as he pleases, whereas the others would have no real voting 
power at all. That makes unilateral control right allocation inefficient for board rights. But do 
we observe the expected contingent control right allocation? 
 
Although the VCs have invested substantial amounts in their portfolio companies and often 
have the majority of shares, we only observe VC majority on the board in three companies. 
This is consistent with the findings of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). But even if they do not 
have the majority, they still have powerful positions on the board of directors.  
 
Under board rights, the right to veto a proposal can be seen as a sub-category. These are the 
rights to prevent an action from being taken. They are never given to E, only to VC contingent 
on the presence of different specified scenarios. In our contracts, the most common areas 
where the VC has veto right are: Transfer of shares, change of business plan, recapitalization 
and sale of substantial and important parts of the company (often also embraced by the 
liquidation preferences).  
 
The veto right is a way for E to ensure a potential investor that certain predefined and 
verifiable actions cannot be taken without the approval of the investor. Thereby he reduces the 
moral hazard problem. For the VC, it is worth quite a lot knowing that E cannot engage in 
value destroying activities.  
 
In advance, it might be difficult to know the VC’s preferred actions when it comes to the 
issues embraced by the veto rights. Whether he wants the business plan altered or not two 
years from now depends on how the company and the surrounding factors evolve. Therefore it 
is not efficient to give either party the authority to chose action, but rather let one party have 
the right to refuse it. Then the action will not be taken unless it is a Pareto-improvement, as E 
has to suggest (VC will not veto his own proposal), and the VC has to approve. E will not 
suggest anything not making him better off, just like the VC will not approve anything not 
making him better off than he already was. 
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In addition to the veto rights, the board is normally bound by several contractual restrictions 
limiting their real power. These restrictions prevent the board of directors from leading the 
company in other directions than the one the VC set out when the contract was signed. Most 
of the restrictions are limiting the impact the board of directors can have on the VC’s position 
in the company.  
 
The distribution of board rights is complex and the model is not fully applicable. The decision 
right is not (in normal situations) contingent on signal, but on who has the majority in the 
board. This majority is usually dependent on coalitions and cooperation between the different 
players represented in the board. We found that except from the three portfolio companies 
mentioned, no boards had a majority of either E or VC. There is usually an even number from 
E and VC, and in addition one or more representatives from other shareholders, stakeholders 
or from a neutral part.  
 
The power the majority has is limited by the veto right given to the VC. This veto rights are 
made contingent on scenarios, consistent with the predictions of the model.  
 
 To signals:  , E does not propose an action VC can veto against 
   , E proposes an action VC can veto against 
 Two actions: , no veto 
   , veto 
 
Here the control right is given to VC contingent on the signal . If VC approves the 
suggestion, he chooses action , and if he disapproves he chooses to veto, action . As 
there are only two actions that the VC can take, there is no need for E to limit VC’s 
possibilities by including restrictions in the contracts. 
 
From our sample it is difficult to find that one of the sides clearly dominates the other when it 
comes to voting power in the board of directors. E and the VC are in general equal in terms of 
voting power, but the contractual restrictions put on the board and the veto rights given to the 
VC shifts the control right allocation in favor of him. 
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4.3.3 Redemption rights 
The right to redemption is the VC’s last resort, and ensures him at least a part of his initial 
investment back. When the action is taken and a company is being subject to the VC’s 
demanded redemption, there is no doubt to any of the parties what is happening. Hence, the 
action “redemption” is verifiable.  
  
Seen from a logical perspective, it is clear that this right cannot be given to E. He has never 
any interest in putting the company to sleep or in giving up his chances at a potential upside. 
Giving him the control would imply removing the effect of redemption as a mechanism, but 
neither is letting VC have the unilateral right a way of insuring first best action being taken. In 
most situations, VC will choose the actions leading to first best scenario, but not always. 
Outside effects can interfere and cause the VC to lose perspective, and consider a long term 
investment on a short term basis. For example: If the VC faces liquidity problems, and has to 
come up with cash to quickly pay his creditors. Then he might choose to demand redemption, 
in order to free as much cash as possible on short notice, even though the signal is good and 
the company is most likely to succeed. 
 
To ensure that the first best action is being taken, most of the contracts in our sample specify 
certain contingencies upon which the right to demand redemption is given to the VC. This is 
in line with our model. As none of the players have incentives comonotonic with total profit, 
the control right should be allocated based on contingencies which are verifiable and lead to a 
situation where the part taking the decision is sure to choose the first best action. We do not 
observe any use of prohibitions and clauses restricting action when it comes to redemption 
rights in the contracts. To understand why, remember that when there are only two choices of 
actions, the contingent contracts are more efficient than the predetermined ones due to the 
increased flexibility. 
 
The contingencies most frequently used are related to performance and time. If the company 
does not succeed in achieving a qualified IPO or a trade sale within a certain time, the VC is 
granted the right to redemption.  
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Interpreted in the model, we can present it like this: 
 
Two signals: , the company has not succeeded in achieving an IPO or a trade 
sale 
   , the company has achieved an IPO or a trade sale 
Two states:     , the company becomes a “high flyer” 
  , the company does not become a “high flyer” 
Two actions:  , not demand redemption 
  , demand redemption 
 
If the signal is good ( ), the company has already been listed or sold (the good state has 
occurred): 
    
The choice (and reason) to demand redemption does no longer exist. This equals action , 
which is in line with the preferences of both E and VC. 
 
If the signal is bad, the company has not succeeded within the limited time. The VC wants 
redemption and E wants to keep the company running. The realization of signal  
triggers a transfer of the right to choose whether the company should live or not to the VC, 
and VC chooses  in line with the model.  
 
The use of this mechanism is clearly shifting the control rights balance in favor of the VC. He 
gets his first best choice no matter what, whereas E only gets his will in the case of a good 
signal.  
 
4.3.4 Liquidation preferences 
The right to liquidate the company is one of the most crucial rights for any venture capital 
investor and entrepreneur. The liquidity preferences enable the VC to receive his payoff in 
cash, and ensure E that he can attract new investors if the company performs extraordinary 
well and gets listed. 
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Liquidation is a verifiable action, and like in the case of redemption rights, there are only two 
possible actions: . Hence we expect the same contract structure 
as for redemption; the right to liquidate distributed between the parties contingent on some 
verifiable signals. 
 
However, that is not what we have found. Although we have only two possible actions, we 
find that the contracts have predetermined actions for the different scenarios. It is not so that 
one party receives the right to liquidate in case of the predetermined events. Instead there are 
clauses in the contracts specifying liquidation in case of so-called “liquidation events” taking 
place. The most used liquidation events are: A qualified IPO, a merger or acquisition, change 
of control in the company, sale of a substantial part of the assets and trade sale. 
 
Based on the model, one can wonder why the rights are not distributed contingent on the 
signal like the model predicts, but rather predetermined actions. We believe it is because the 
model is not applicable in this situation. The liquidity events are not signals giving a higher 
probability of one state of nature than for the other. They are 100 per cent certain signals. If 
there is a qualified IPO, we are 100 per cent certain that the state is good.  
 
  
  
 
Instead of writing a contract where the right is given to E contingent on the liquidity events 
upon which he would prefer to liquidate and to the VC contingent on the events upon he 
would prefer to liquidate, they have chosen a simpler version. By defining the liquidity events 
up front, they avoid arguments and negotiations and get a more efficient contract where there 
is no room for doubt whether the company should be liquidated or not.  
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4.3.5 Anti-dilution 
Unlike the other rights we have mentioned so far, the pre-emption side of anti-dilution is a 
one sided right protecting only the VC. Even if the contract includes a pre-emption right to E, 
it is useless for him in real life. Due to his wealth constraint (recall that one of the 
assumptions upon which our models are built is that E has no initial wealth); it is not possible 
for him to acquire new shares anyway.  
 
When the VC exercises his right to pre-emption, it does not happen on the expense of E. The 
new shares would be issued anyway, and as E cannot buy, VC’s purchase does not reduce his 
control more than it does when another investor buys the shares. Hence, pre-emption is not 
comparable to the other control-rights, as it only affects the ownership share of the VC (and 
thereby his control and influence over the company), but not the control right balance between 
E and the VC. The anti-dilution can therefore be said to be neutral when it comes to shifting 
the control right balance of the company between E and VC, and does not work in favor of 
one of the parts on the expense of the other. It is simply a result of the VC taking advantage of 
his capital to strengthen his position on the expense of other potential external investors. 
 
What about the exceptions to the pre-emption rights, can they affect the balance? As long as E 
has no capital for which he can buy new shares, it does not matter who buys them, as E is 
going to see his ownership share being diluted anyway. On the other hand, what the 
exceptions theoretically can do, is to inflict the VC in a negative way. One can imagine 
restrictions on the VC’s rights preventing him from increasing his percentage ownership, or at 
least keeping the ownership on the same level, but in our sample of contracts we find no such 
exceptions. The exceptions are the same in most of the contracts, and include only such issues 
where it would not be logic to offer shares to the share owners. The most frequently used 
exceptions are:  
 
 New issues made for anti-dilution purposes. If anti-dilution shares were to trigger new 
anti-dilution issues, we would have a never ending spiral.  
 Exercise of warrants. The value of warrants is already calculated for, and they would 
lose value if anti-dilution efforts were to be made. Then the person receiving the 
warrants would demand a higher number of warrants, which again would trigger more 
anti-dilution shares to be issued and so on. 
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 Issue of shares as a part of an “employee share option plan” (ESOP). The reason is the 
same as for warrants. If their employee’s shares would be diluted by new share issues, 
they would lose value, and the company would have to grant the employees more 
shares. 
 
4.3.6 Non-compete and non-solicit clauses 
As said earlier in the paper, there is a double-sided moral hazard problem. I.e. both E and the 
VC can carry out hidden actions destroying the value of the other party. We therefore 
expected to find non-compete and non-solicit clauses restricting both the VC and E’s 
possibilities to engage in negotiations with competitors or potential competitors of the firm.  
 
For an action to be prohibited, our model assumes that the action is verifiable and that there 
are more than two alternative actions that can be taken. Non-compete clauses restrict the 
ability of one part to engage in any kind of activity with companies that, directly and 
indirectly compete with the company. The range of possible actions covered by this clause is 
huge. Everything from discussing possible cooperation to actually start working for the 
competitor falls under the jurisdiction of non-competition clauses. So it fits the model when it 
comes to a number of possible actions. What is not so easy to conclude, is to which extent the 
actions are verifiable. In our opinion that differs within the range of possible actions. Some 
actions, like terminating the employment with the company to start working for a competitor 
are easily verifiable, whereas other actions, like discussing future plans are difficult to verify. 
According to the model, the right thing would then be to separate the actions which are 
verifiable and not, and handle them separately with prohibitions for the verifiable ones, and 
contingent control rights for the unverifiable.  
 
The problem then, is that the contract would be very long. As the range of possible actions to 
be covered by such a contract is so extensive, this would not be an efficient solution. And as 
long as all the actions governed by the general non-compete clause are undesired (from the 
VC’s side) actions, it is much easier to prohibit them up front.  
 
In addition to a more efficient contracting process, we also achieve a contract with less room 
for hold-ups. If none of the parts have the right to decide, the other part has nothing to gain 
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from threatening to hold-up or in other ways sabotage the company. Such actions could 
potentially cause huge dead weight losses, as a person seeking to leave the company has 
nothing to lose from the company struggling in the time after his resignation. 
 
In the contracts we observe that the non-compete and non-solicit clauses apply only for E. 
There is nothing mentioned anywhere about the obligations of VC in such cases. This is 
clearly pushing the control rights balance in favor of the VC, as his actions are not restricted 
in the same way as E’s actions. We also have to mention, that it is more likely to observe that 
E wants to leave the company to start working with a competitor than VC doing the same. E’s 
capital is his human capital, which he brings along if he decides to break out of the 
cooperation with the VC. The VC has capital invested in the company, and risks losing the 
investment if he breaks out. So even though in theory, the clauses should apply evenly to VC 
and E, there are practical reasons to why E is more restricted than VC. 
 
4.3.7 Vesting 
Vesting has much of the same effects as non-compete and non-solicit. It is a mechanism that 
inflicts losses on E if he decides to terminate his contract with the company.  
 
In our sample, we have found surprisingly few examples of vesting. In venture capital theory, 
vesting is commonly known as a well functioning tool to prevent the key personnel from 
leaving the company before their value is fully incorporated. In our sample, only one 
company included this in the contract. They had 25 per cent vesting per year for four years. 
So if E was to terminate his employment before four years had passed, he would not be 
allowed to take with him all the shares he had earned. If the company shows a positive 
development, that can be a high price to pay for leaving early. 
 
Instead of vesting, we found several contracts that included “buy back”. I.e. a right the 
company has to buy back the shares from key personnel leaving the company before a certain 
time. The price at which they buy back can be set at different levels. We found that the typical 
duration of a buy back was two years, and that the typical buyback price was equal to lowest 
issuing price or subscription price minus a discount.  
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To compare the effects of buy back and vesting, we have created the following example 
where we assume that E has one share in the company (figure 23). The share price is shown 
with the red line. The blue line represents the payoff for E if the contract includes a buy back 
clause with duration of 4 years and a buy back price set to 50 per cent of subscription price. 
The black line represents the payoff of an entrepreneur whose contract include a vesting 
clause with duration 4 years and 25 per cent per year.  
 
Figure 23 
 
The chart paints a clear picture of the differences between vesting and buy back. As the 
payoff to the entrepreneur with a vesting provision is approaching the true value of his share 
over time, the payoff to the other entrepreneur remains at a constant, and the share he gets of 
the real value decreases for every year. As the four years have passed, both entrepreneurs 
have the right to 100 per cent of their share, and they then get a payoff equal to the market 
value. 
 
A contract with buy back is better for an E who is going to quit early, and then incur a loss as 
small as possible. As vesting concerned, the longer period of time the better E will be 
compensated if he decides to leave. Recall the earlier discussion about staging, where we 
explained that the value to the company of E is larger in the beginning and becomes smaller 
as more and more of E’s human capital is incorporated in the company. Following that, 
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vesting seems like a more efficient mechanism than buy back. And to E vesting seems much 
fairer, as he receives a compensation that increases with his own investment of human capital 
in the company.  
 
Still, buy backs are the most commonly used mechanism of the two in Norway. One possible 
reason might be that the VC expects the probability of E quitting to be higher after a few 
years than in the beginning. To give E the incentives to stay throughout the contracted period, 
the consequences of leaving has to be as large as possible. For an informed E, the use of buy 
back can be a bad signal. He might wonder why the VC believes that there is a higher chance 
of him leaving after a few years. Do they have plans which will reduce his private benefits? If 
E thinks like this, including buy back instead of vesting can be expensive for the VC, as E 
demands compensation for possibly reduced future private benefits.  
 
Both vesting and buy back are mechanisms helping the VC to control E, and thereby shifts the 
balance of control in direction of VC. But it could be that they are paying a high price for it. 
Maybe they would get the same effect from shifting from buy back to vesting, and thereby 
reduce the compensation of E?  
 
4.3.9 Drag along  
In all the examined contracts we found the mechanisms ROFR (right of first refusal) tag along 
and drag along. ROFR is set as default by the Norwegian Companies Act (§4), but can be put 
aside if stated in the bylaws or by the board of directors with at least 2/3 majority. Tag along 
and drag along are not rights found in the Companies Act. They come from the venture capital 
business, and are common in contracts in the US as well as in Europe (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2003).   
 
The typical drag along provisions allow all share owners with a certain percentage ownership 
(usually 50 per cent making the VC the only part actually given the rights by the contract) the 
right to force the other share owners to sell if they receive an offer on their shares that is 
contingent on the sale of the whole company. Usually the other shareholders have a right of 
first refusal on the selling investor’s shares. However, if the only other part is E, and he is 
wealth constrained, it is unlikely that he is capable of using his ROFR, which implies that 
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drag along usually is a mechanism for the VC to force E into selling his shares. The use of 
drag along provisions is making the company more liquid and provides the VC with an 
opportunity to get out without the approval of E. This shifts the control right balance in the 
VC’s direction. 
 
When the drag along right is executed, the party selling his shares is forcing his action on the 
other parties. In the context of the model, we can present the mechanism like this: 
 
Two signals: , an external buyer offers to buy shares from a shareholder having 
a drag along right 
, no offers made on the shares of the shareholder having a drag 
along right 
Two actions:   demand that the other shareholders sell their shares 
   : not demanding that other shareholders sell their shares 
 
As long as the total payoff is maximized when all shares are sold in the case of a bid, and no 
shares are sold in the case on no bids, the first best pairs of signals and actions are:  
and . If there is no bids, it does not matter who gets to decide, as there is no 
possibility of exercising the drag along right anyway. Therefore the easiest and most efficient 
way to solve this situation is to exclude the drag along right in the case of no bids. To ensure 
first best action being taken in the case of a bid, the right should then be granted to the part 
wanting to sell his shares to the external investor contingent upon him receiving the bid.  
 
Examining the contracts, this structure is exactly what we find. As long as there are no bids on 
the shares of a shareholder owning a certain percentage of the firm (usually 50 per cent), no 
one has the right to force others to sell. But when the offer is made on the shares of the parties 
included by the drag along clause, this party is granted the drag along right.  
 
Even if including drag along rights is efficient, it does not necessarily maximize the utility of 
E. Because he also has a certain private benefit, it might be so that he would prefer other 
actions to be taken than the ones the VC prefers. Therefore it is wrong to conclude that drag 
along is neutral what regards the control rights balance, as the VC is sure to have his first best 
choice, E is not. Therefore also this provision shifts the balance in favor of the VC.  
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4.3.10 ROFR and tag along 
Both ROFR and tag along rights have, as mentioned earlier, been found in every contract in 
our sample. Unlike drag along, the tag along is granted every shareholder on equal terms. The 
typical tag along that we have found, states that when a shareholder sells (a portion of) his 
shares, the other shareholders have the right to sell an equal percentage of their shares to the 
same buyer at the exact same terms as the first seller. If the buyer is not willing to buy all the 
shares, the first seller is obliged to buy the specified quantity of shares from the other 
investors at the same price as he sold his own. This could be very expensive. In some 
contracts we have found that the tag along rights does not apply to sales made by investors 
owning less than a certain percent of the total number of shares (usually around 5 per cent). 
The smallest investors do not have the same obligations as the larger, making their shares 
more liquid, and also more worth. For the VC it is no danger in excluding them from the tag 
along clause, as their fractions of shares are too small to cause any significant change to the 
power balance in the company.  
 
Both ROFR and tag along are mechanisms that can incur two different actions which are 
easily verifiable; to sell or not to sell. Still our model is not applicable for these mechanisms, 
because they are not so much about the course of the company as they are about the individual 
shareholders. When the right of first refusal or the right to tag along is being executed, it does 
not lead to one party taking actions that affect the company and other parties directly. Both E 
and the VC decide for themselves if they want to buy newly issued shares, or if they want to 
co-sell their shares. It is not like closing down the company or firing the management. 
Therefore the model is unfit for these mechanisms, and there is no reason to expect a contract 
with contingent control rights to be more efficient when it comes to ROFR and tag along.  
 
It is no problem for the VC that the tag along provision is granted all investors on equal terms. 
An outside investor wanting to buy his big shareholding is most likely to want to buy the 
whole company anyway. However, for E (or other smaller investors) it reduces the liquidity, 
as any buyer must be prepared to offer the same price and conditions to the other investors. So 
even if it might seem like the tag along provision is protecting all shareholders equally, it is 
just another mechanism for the VC to strengthen his position on the behalf of E. 
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ROFR is a neutral provision functioning according to the suggestions in the Companies Act. 
It is granted all shareholders on equal terms, thus does not affect the power balance. 
 
4.3.11 Staging 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg’s (2003) findings, we expected to find staging 
represented in almost all of the contracts were the financing could be split up in two or more 
portions. And in line with the article of Neher (1999), the renegotiation should take place at a 
point in time where the negotiation power of E is as small as possible.  
 
Our findings indicate a somewhat less sophisticated used of staging in Norwegian contracts. 
Staging does frequently occur, but the timing of later financing rounds does not correspond to 
Neher’s (1999) findings.  
 
In a little under half of our sample, we found staging as an explicit mechanism. The maximal 
amount to be invested and the timing were present in most of these contracts. But instead of 
locating the renegotiation to the time when E has less renegotiation power contingent on the 
embodiment of E’s human capital, the later financing rounds are in our samples located to a 
certain time or period contingent on the company’s need for more cash. From the VC’s point 
of view, this is not optimal, as there is no guarantee that refinancing occurs right after a part 
of E’s human capital has been embodied in the firm.    
 
Instead of explicitly outlined rules for the later financing, we have found that the granting of 
an option to supply the company’s later capital needs to the VC is commonly used. This 
option states that the VC has the right of first refusal for all later investments in the company. 
This applies to issuance of new shares as well as for convertible loans and all other forms of 
debt increasing actions. The option can have an upper limit (total sum invested) after which 
all investors have the same right to participate in share issues on equal terms at a pro-rata 
basis.  
 
The way staging is used in Norway does not provide the VC with the renegotiation power it 
optimally could have done. By making the later financing rounds contingent on embodiment 
of the human capital of E, the VC can increase his negotiation power and thereby also shift 
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the control rights balance in his favor. However, as currently applied, staging as a mechanism 
does not affect the balance of control noticeably.  
 
4.3.12 Summing up  
Summing up the effects the different mechanisms have on the distribution of control rights, 
we find that the control rights balance is clearly tipped towards the VC. This is as expected, 
since there is a higher level of moral hazard connected to the actions of E than to the actions 
of the VC. All mechanisms are working either in favor of the VC or are neutral (not shifting 
the balance in favor of neither the VC nor E). 
 
Mechanisms working in favor of the VC: 
 Board rights 
 Redemption rights 
 Anti-dilution 
 Non-compete and non-solicit 
 Tag along 
 Drag along 
 Vesting / buy back 
 
Neutral mechanisms: 
 Voting 
 Liquidation preferences 
 ROFR 
   
Most of the mechanisms are used optimally (from the VC’s perspective) according to the 
model and related theory. But still there are some mechanisms where we believe that the VC 
would have an interest in making changes to the contractual structure. 
 
The first mechanism where we can spot a potential for the VC to increase his level of control 
rights is staging. We believe that by giving the timing of later financing rounds and 
renegotiation more consideration, the VC should be able to decrease the negotiation power of 
the E, and thereby not having to pay as much for the desired control rights. 
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For a more efficient contract regarding the value of E to the company, there could be made 
some adjustments to the vesting and buy back clauses. As described earlier, there seem to be 
some inefficiency in the typical use of buy back rights in Norwegian contracts. Depending on 
the sophistication level of E (whether E fully understands the different incentive effects for 
the VC from vesting and buy back), including buy back instead of vesting can be expensive 
for the VC. This extra cost is not necessary unless the VC needs an extra strong grip on E. 
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5. Conclusion  
Throughout the thesis, the main focus has been on finding the optimal contractual structures 
in venture capital financing. Recall the problem definition: “Are contractual mechanisms 
applied in Norwegian venture capital transactions optimal for minimizing agent-principal 
costs?” The first part of the thesis approached the problem from a theoretical perspective. We 
constructed models, based on well recognised academic research studies, which outlined 
contractual structures leading to the first best solutions in three different scenarios; good, 
medium and bad.  
 
Most of our findings indicate that the contracts used in the Norwegian venture capital market 
are to a high extent in line with the studies from the US venture capital market and the applied 
theory. In general, the observed mechanisms mitigate the double-sided moral hazard problem, 
however, there are some deviations. It seems that the distribution of cash flow rights is 
levered towards the VC, due to the fact that the most observed financial claim (full 
participating preferred share) favours the VC on E’s expense compared to the theoretically 
optimal claim (recall the comparison of figure 22 and 13). Looking at control rights, we find 
the same leverage towards the VC. However, this is aligned with the theory, thus does not 
represent deviations. Still, there are two mechanisms used in a non optimal way referring to 
the theory. The use of buy back instead of vesting is a deviation from Kaplan and Strömberg’s 
(2003) analysis of the US venture capital industry, and shifts the control right balance power 
further in direction of the VC than theory suggests. We also observe that staging is used 
uncritically by the VC, granting E the right to choose the time of refinancing negotiations, 
hence an increase in allocated control rights to E. 
 
The respective results from control and cash flow rights cannot be seen independently. The 
contracts are formed through a negotiation process, thereby both control and cash flow rights 
are subject to a trade-off. In some situations a deviations in cash flow rights can be offset by a 
deviation in control rights. As the deviations favour of the VC, there is no reason to assume 
that a trade off can explain our findings. Note that there is no one to one relationship between 
control and cash flow rights mechanisms.  
 
Another possible explanation might be that some provisions are complements. I.e.an increase 
in VC cash flow rights must be followed up by an increase of VC control rights. We believe 
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that there could exist such a connection between the choice of financial claims and restrictions 
connected to founder’s shares. When full participating preferred shares are chosen, the VC 
receives a larger fraction of the upside proceeds than assumed theoretically optimal. When the 
founder’s shares are subject to buy back instead of vesting provisions, E’s opportunity cost of 
terminating the employment is larger (recall figure 23), hence demands a smaller fraction of 
the upside proceeds to remain with the company. 
 
A third explanation is that the theoretical models are not complex enough to cover the issues 
of the real world. The main objection to our models is the assumption of discreetly distributed 
signal and state. However, in real life, both signal and state are continuously distributed, and 
confining them in intervals may increase the chance of misinterpretations and errors.  
 
In this paper, we have found that contractual mechanisms applied in Norwegian venture 
capital transactions contribute to minimize the agent-principal costs, even though there are 
some possible areas of improvement. Whether these are real deviations or optimal solutions 
not covered by the model is still to be explored. 
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Glossary 
This glossary is extracted from an article published by the British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA). 
 
Anti-dilution provisions 
Provisions which protect the holder's investment from dilution as the result of later issues of 
shares at a lower price than the investor paid by adjusting the option price or conversion ratio 
or issuing new shares 
 
Burn rate 
The rate at which a company is consuming cash each month. 
 
Capitalize 
Converting a debt owed to a company into equity 
 
Completion or closing 
In the context of a venture capital investment round, the release of investment funds to the 
company and the issuance of shares to the investors following execution of the investment 
documents and verification that all necessary conditions have been fulfilled. 
 
Conversion 
The act of exchanging one form of security for another security of the same company, e.g. 
preferred 
shares for ordinary shares, debt securities for equity (see paragraph 6, Section IV above). 
 
Conversion ratio 
The ratio indicating the number of underlying securities that can be acquired upon exchange 
of a convertible security, e.g. the number of ordinary shares into which preferred shares are 
convertible 
 
Convertible debt 
A debt obligation of a company which is convertible into shares. 
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Convertible preferred shares 
Preferred shares convertible into ordinary shares. 
 
Co-sale or Tag along rights 
A mechanism to ensure that if one investor or founder has an opportunity to sell shares the 
other shareholders are also given that opportunity on a proportional basis.  
 
Covenants 
Undertakings given to the investors by the company and sometimes the founders to do or not 
do certain acts  
 
Cumulative dividends 
A dividend which accumulates if not paid in the period when due and must be paid in full 
before other dividends are paid on the company's ordinary shares. 
 
Cumulative preferred shares 
A form of preferred shares which provides that if one or more dividends is omitted, those 
dividends accumulate and must be paid in full before other dividends may be paid on the 
company's ordinary shares 
 
Debt/equity ratio 
A measure of a company's leverage, calculated by dividing long-term debt by ordinary 
shareholders' equity. 
 
Debt financing 
Financing by selling notes or other debt instruments. 
 
Deemed liquidation or liquidity event 
Term used to describe trigger events for a liquidation preference. Usually defined to cover, 
among other things, a merger, acquisition, change of control or consolidation of the company, 
or a sale of all or most of its assets. 
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Default 
Failure to discharge a contractual obligation, e.g. to pay interest or principal on a debt when 
due. 
 
Dilution 
The process by which an investor's percentage holding of shares in a company is reduced by 
the issuance of new securities 
 
Down round 
A round of venture capital financing in which the valuation of the company is less than the 
previous round. 
 
Drag along/bring along 
A mechanism ensuring that if a specified percentage of shareholders agree to sell their shares, 
they can compel the others to sell ensuring that a prospective purchaser can acquire 100% of a 
company 
 
Early stage capital 
Finance for companies to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales, following receipt of 
seed capital. 
 
Employee share option plan (ESOP) 
A scheme to enable employees to acquire shares in the companies in which they work 
 
Exercise price 
The price at which an option or warrant can be exercised. 
 
Exit mechanism 
Term used to describe the method by which a venture capitalist will eventually sell out of an 
investment 
 
Follow-on investment round 
An additional investment by existing and/or new investors, which may be provided for in 
documentation relating to the initial investment. 
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Founder shares 
Shares issued to the founders of a company, usually at a low price in comparison to that paid 
by investors. See also Sweat equity. 
 
Full ratchet 
Anti-dilution provisions that apply the lowest sale price for any ordinary shares (or 
equivalents) sold by the company after the issuing of an option or convertible share as being 
the adjusted option price or conversion price for those options or shares. 
 
Fully diluted share capital 
The issued share capital of a company if all options and other rights to subscribe for shares are 
exercised. 
 
Fully participating 
Term sometimes used to describe a liquidation preference which entitles beneficiaries to 
receive a priority initial fixed payment and share pro rata with other share classes in any 
remaining proceeds. 
 
Good leaver/bad leaver 
A criteria applied to a shareholder employee who is ceasing to be employed to determine 
whether his shares should be subject to a compulsory sale, and if so, at what price. 
 
Independent or outside director 
A non-executive member of the Board of Directors who is not an employee of a company nor 
affiliated with a controlling shareholder of a company. The definition of independent may be 
further defined in different countries or markets. 
 
Initial public offering (IPO) 
The sale of shares to the public by a company for the first time. Prior to an IPO, companies 
that sell shares to investors are considered privately held. This is the first time that a company 
has tried to raise funds on a public market such as a share exchange. Terms used to describe 
this are flotation, float, going public, listing when a company obtains a quotation on a stock 
market. 
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Intangibles 
The non-physical assets of a company that have a value, e.g. intellectual property rights 
including trademarks and patents. 
 
Liquidation or winding up 
The sale of all of a company's assets, for distribution to creditors and shareholders in order of 
priority. This may be as a result of the insolvency of the company or by agreement amongst 
shareholders 
 
Liquidation preference 
A negotiated term of a round of venture capital financing that calls for certain investors to 
have all or most of their entire investment repaid if the company is liquidated. Often also 
triggered by a deemed liquidation. 
 
Liquidity 
Converting an asset (such as shares) to cash. 
 
Listing 
When a company's shares are traded on a stock market it is said to be listed. 
 
Lock-up 
A provision in the Underwriting Agreement between an investment bank and existing 
shareholders that prohibits corporate insiders and private equity investors from selling for a 
certain period of time following a public offering. 
 
Milestone 
A contractual target that must be met by the company. Often used by investors as a condition 
for releasing further amounts of financing. 
 
Ordinary shares 
These are equity shares that are entitled to all income and capital after the rights of all other 
classes of capital and creditors have been satisfied. 
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Pari passu 
Equally, rateably, without preference. Generally used to describe securities which are to be 
treated as being of equal priority or preference. 
 
Participating preferred shares 
Preferred shares which entitle the holder not only to its stated dividend and liquidation 
preference, but also allows the holder to participate in dividends and liquidating distributions 
declared on ordinary shares. 
 
Pay to play (Pay or Play) 
A provision which requires investors to participate in subsequent rounds or forfeit certain 
rights such as anti-dilution. 
 
Pre-emption right 
The right of an investor to participate in a financing to the extent necessary to ensure that, if 
exercised, its percentage ownership of the company's securities will remain the same after the 
financing as it was before. Sometimes also used as a term for a right of first refusal on shares 
of other investors 
 
Put option 
A contract whereby the holder of the option has the right to sell to the grantor shares at a 
specific price (strike price) at some time in the future. 
 
Qualified IPO 
An IPO which gives the company a market capitalization of at least a certain amount (often a 
multiple of the valuation at the time of an investment) and is accompanied by a fully 
underwritten fund raising of a certain amount 
 
Recapitalization 
The reorganization of a company's capital structure by the infusion of new cash and/or the 
replacement of current shareholders by new ones. Recapitalization can be an alternative exit 
strategy for venture capitalists. 
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Ratchets 
A structure whereby the eventual equity allocations between the groups of shareholders 
depend on either the future performance of the company or the rate of return achieved by the 
venture capital firm. This allows management shareholders to increase their stake if the 
company performs particularly well. 
 
Redeemable shares 
Shares which the company can be made to repurchase or which the company has the right to 
repurchase at a predetermined value 
 
Right of first refusal (ROFR) 
A contractual right, frequently granted to venture capitalists, to purchase shares held by other 
shareholders before such shares may be sold to a third party 
 
Seed capital 
Capital provided to allow a business concept to be developed, perhaps involving the 
production of a business plan, prototypes and additional research, prior to bringing a product 
to market and commercial large-scale manufacturing. 
 
Series 
A round of venture capital financing. Each sequential round is distinguished by a letter: A, B, 
C, etc. 
 
Shareholders' Agreement/Investor Rights Agreement 
Many of the rights between shareholders in a company are set out in its Articles of 
Association. This is a public document that is filed at Companies House. In many cases 
shareholders will want to create rights and obligations between them that they would prefer to 
keep confidential. In such cases, rather than put those rights and obligations into a public 
document they will enter into private contractual arrangements, in a document such as a 
Shareholders' Agreement. If the agreement also includes terms relating to the 
subscription for shares it will often be referred to as the Investment Agreement 
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Sweat equity 
Equity (shares in a company) which is given to the founder of the company in recognition of 
the effort (sweat) which he has expended in getting the company started up 
 
Syndication 
An arrangement whereby a group of investors come together to invest in an investment 
proposition which they would not be prepared to consider individually whether because of 
risk or amount of funding required. There is however usually a lead investor 
 
Trade sale 
Sale of a company to another company. As a form of exit, it is an alternative to flotation and 
more common. 
 
Tranching 
Investment made in stages; each stage being dependent on achievement of targets or 
milestones. 
 
Transfer restrictions 
Restriction of the sale of shares by founders, management or investors for a predefined period 
of time or until certain conditions have been fulfilled. 
 
Vesting 
Where an employee or consultant has been granted rights to receive options or has been 
issued shares which are subject to his completing a specific length of service or achieving 
certain milestones, the options or shares will have vested when the period or milestone has 
been satisfied. Once vested the employee or consultant is entitled to exercise those options to 
obtain shares or to receive full rights to the shares. 
 
Warrant 
Another word for an option to purchase a security. The term is generally used for options 
provided by the company to outside investors (as distinct from officers, employees, etc.). 
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Weighted average 
Anti-dilution provisions that apply a weighted average formula to adjust the option price or 
conversion ratio of an early-round investor, based on the sale price and number of equivalent 
shares sold by the company after the issuing of the option or convertible security 
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